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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PROBLEMS IN TROOP RECRUITING RESOLVED IN TIENG GIANG PROVINCE

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Khac Xue: "Several Experiences in Troop Recruiting in Tien Giang Province"]

[Excerpt] During these historic days of August, the people of Tien Giang Province have been filled with revolutionary spirit as they bid their sons farewell on their way to protect the fatherland. Everywhere one goes in all districts and cities, from the coastal area of Go Cong to the villages along Route 4 and the new economic zones bordering Dong Thap, one notices an atmosphere of excitement and intensity as the people bid farewell to youths going to join the army. Compared to previous years, there has truly been a change in troop recruiting activities in Tien Giang this year.

Tien Giang has been simultaneously carrying out troop recruitment, the recruitment of labor, the transformation of private, capitalist industry and commerce and the transformation of agriculture while mobilizing all the people to fulfill their grain obligation; in this work, troop recruiting is the important link because, if carried out well, it will have a major influence upon every aspect of social life. The mobilization of youths to fulfill their military obligation involves the mobilization of manpower, the mobilization of the most precious assets of each family. This job must be performed well in order to create the conditions for stimulating their performance of other jobs. In past years, many efforts were made in troop recruiting by Tien Giang but the province always failed to meet requirements. These difficulties were partially the result of ineffective leadership and limited awareness on the part of the masses and partially the result of sabotage, rumors, distortions and the provocation of youths by the enemy by means of many sophisticated and crafty tricks. Under these conditions, the fear of sacrifices and the desire to take life easy had more than a small influence upon some youths. There was also one shortcoming that must be pointed out, that is, the failure on the part of a number of cadres to set a good example by abusing their authority or position or relying upon relatives to find ways by which their sons could avoid their military obligation. The people, cadres and party members who raised questions

were suppressed and threatened. There was also one locality that used administrative measures to bring pressure to bear upon the masses.

Lieutenant Colonel Ba Khoi, deputy commander of the Tien Giang military command, stated: "The difficulties in troop recruiting in the past were due to the failure on the part of Tien Giang to build the revolutionary-offensive spirit of the masses and tap their love of their homeland. Military recruiting was only being carried out by the local military agency. Any participation by the government and the role played by the mass organizations were only symbolic in nature. This time, we have considered the directive issued by the premier concerning military recruiting to be a law with which there must be strict and resolute compliance."

Party Members Go First

After listening to the report by the military command on troop recruiting in 1980, the standing committee of the provincial party committee convened a meeting to discuss and establish guidelines and issue a specific resolution. The various members of the standing committee were sent to the various districts to disseminate the resolution of the provincial party committee on military recruiting. The commander of the provincial military agency worked with and supervised Cai Lay District. They assessed the situation each day, reported it to the Secretariat of the provincial party committee and made suggestions concerning ways to provide guidance. Each deputy commander was put in charge of one district and kept in close touch with a few villages. Deputy Commander Lieutenant Colonel Le Quang Cong went to the three villages of Phuoc Tay, My Thanh Trung and My Thanh Dong to guide the movement. These are three villages that were weak and deficient in the past. In these villages, some very lively and beneficial meetings were held between the masses and cadres. In the atmosphere during these days of August of a "Dien Hong Conference," of "all the people discussing the affairs of state," the residents forthrightly expressed their opinions and evaluated each and every cadre and party member in terms of who was setting good examples, who was not and who had committed shortcomings. This was an opportunity for the masses to fully express their thoughts. It was also an opportunity for each cadre and party member to appropriately evaluate their achievements and shortcomings and, on this basis, establish their responsibility for setting examples by encouraging their children to eagerly leave to fulfill their obligation to protect the fatherland.

Fair Troop Recruiting in Exact Accordance with Policy

Being fair and complying with policies in military recruiting have a very large motivational impact. Persons eligible for deferments must be carefully evaluated and deferments must be granted in exact accordance with the spirit of the directives of the Council of Ministers and the instructions provided by the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee. When we went to

Cai Lay District, the members of the district party committee told us about the case of comrade B., the secretary of the P. Hamlet Party Chapter. Because he wanted his son to remain at home, comrade B. declared that his eldest son was younger than he actually is. The residents of the hamlet contributed constructive opinions but he still tried to defend his actions. When he failed to change his mind after being reminded, the district party committee was forced to remove comrade B. from his assignment. In the face of constructive, sincere and resolute criticism, comrade B. admitted to his shortcoming, apologized to the masses and agreed to have his eldest son leave to fulfill the obligation of youths. In Phu An Village, there was the case of the family of Mrs. T. whose 18 year old son left school and went to the city to find work. The agency of C.B. District did not adhere to principles and, instead of conducting a detailed inspection, certified that her son was a student in vocational training at a time when the necessary changes in their census registration and grain ration coupons had not been made. Through forthright struggle, neighbors pointed out this mistake and, as a result, Mrs. T. no longer dared to ask that her son be deferred any longer. At the same time, the transportation Bureau of C.T. District forwarded to the military agency papers certifying that a number of 18 year old youths were captains on ships working on the rivers. These improprieties should not have been tolerated by the military agency.

Compared to Cai Be, Cai Lay District has surpassed its quota by slightly less (Cai Be by 46 percent and Cai Lay by 9 percent); however, the standing committee of the provincial party committee and the provincial military agency still consider the movement in Cai Lay to be more comprehensive and stable. Because, in addition to military recruiting, Cai Lay has also done a good job of rounding up the youths who failed to obey the military obligation law in the various phases of troop recruiting. Cai Lay has performed this job in a rapid, systematic, urgent and thorough manner. The purchasing of grain has also exceeded norms and been completed ahead of schedule.

It must be pointed out that, in the course of carrying out the policies mentioned above, the various party committee echelons and the military commands on the various echelons of Tien Giang Province have encountered more than a few difficulties as a result of resistance by a number of negative, degenerate elements. The province's population of more than 1,257,000 consists of dozens of ethnic minorities and many religions of various types plus a number of personnel of the old puppet army and puppet government who have refused transformation, thereby making the situation increasingly complex. However, every negative manifestation has been repulsed. As a result of organizing and guiding military recruiting in a fair, reasonable manner complying with policies, the military recruiting movement of Tien Giang has developed smoothly. In practically every district, hundreds of fervent requests have been received to be allowed to join the army and fulfill the noble obligation of youths to bear arms in defense of the fatherland.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

HISTORY OF VIETNAMESE GENERAL STAFF RELATED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai: "Commemorating the 35th anniversary of the Founding of the General Staff (7 September 1945 to 7 September 1980): President Ho Chi Minh and the Organization of Military Command"]

[Text] The organization of military command is a very great strategic-military problem for a nation. Only the organization of appropriate military command can assure that command is unified, centralized, uninterrupted, continuous, prompt, and comprehensive, and only thereby can there be developed combined strength with which to fulfill the nation's political responsibilities.

According to their special characteristics and political systems, individual countries have their own methods of organizing military command. But no matter what the political system, in organizing military command the ruling class must always ensure that it can tightly control the armed forces. Therefore, the armed forces are an instrument of violence for achieving class dictatorship. Without control of the armed forces, the political administration cannot be controlled. The proletarian class realized at an early date that it was necessary to have an army in order to control the political administration, and that the party must control leadership of the army.

Lenin said that "In order to defend the political administration of the workers and peasants in order to oppose the thieves, i.e. the landlords and bourgeoisie, we must have a powerful Red Army." (1) "We must defeat not only the White Guard but also world imperialism. We must defeat the enemy, and we will defeat them. We will defeat not only them, but even more fearsome enemies. If we are to do so, it is most essential that we have the Red Army. I hope that every organization of the Soviet state always places the matter of the army in the front rank. Now, when everything is clear, the matter of war has become a matter of strengthening the army. That is a foremost concern." (2)

In order to tightly control the Red Army, Lenin placed the army under the leadership of the army under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, and organized a General Staff to command the army.

That absolutely does not mean that the army alone can do everything or propose everything. Lenin always regarded the popular forces, especially the workers and peasants, of whom the Red Army was the hard-core force and which was placed in the fore, as the forces which decided the winning and maintaining of political power.

President Ho Chi Minh always firmly grasped those viewpoints of Lenin. He always realized that it is necessary to rely on the peerless strength of the entire population, and that at the same time it is necessary to build powerful armed forces to serve as the hard core so that the people can win and keep political power. Those forces must be absolutely and directly led by the Vietnam Communist Party in all regards.

Immediately after our people took political power throughout the country, President Ho posed the necessity of organizing command and leadership organs for the armed forces.

On 7 September 1945, only 5 days after the Declaration of Independence, President Ho decided to set up the General Staff. He said that "We have just won independence and freedom. The entire nation is positively building the Liberation Army and self-defense forces in order to, along with the people, maintain peace and freedom. In accordance with the instructions of the mass organization, the General Staff is hereby established to command the army throughout the nation.

"The General Staff is the secret military organ of the mass organization and is the headquarters organ of the army. It has the mission of building a strong army, skilfully training troops, clearly understanding ourselves and the enemy, using clever stratagems, and organizing command that is unified, secret, responsive, accurate, and prompt, in order to defeat all enemies.

"We are not experienced, do not know much about staff work, and are experiencing difficulties, but if we go all-out to work while studying and are determined we can overcome all difficulties and create a strong, skilled Vietnamese staff for the army, one that is worthy of the resourceful, creative, heroic, and indomitable Vietnamese people, in order to defend the independence of the homeland and the freedom of the people."

During the first days of the democratic republican regime, Uncle Ho ordered the formation of the Political Department -- which later was later developed into the Political general Department -- to do the party work and political work in the army, and of the Quartermaster Bureau -- which later became the Rear Services General Department -- to meet the army's material needs.

In October 1945 the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee and President Ho decided to divide our country into combat zones -- now military regions. Bac Bo was divided into military zones 1, 2, and 3; Trung Bo was divided into military zones 4, 5, and 6; and Nam Bo was divided into military zones 7, 8, and 9. Hanoi, the capital, was made a special zone directly under the Central Committee.

In January 1946, Uncle Ho and the Party Central Committee decided to set up the Central Military Party Committee to help the Party Central Committee guide the military work of the entire nation, and to lead the party organizations in the army.

Uncle Ho and the Party Central Committee assigned trustworthy cadres -- including many party members with years of seniority -- to head the staff, political, and quartermaster organs, and to lead and command the military zones and detachments of the Liberation Army.

Thus in a very brief period of time President Ho and the Party Central Committee the most basic, greatest problems regarding the organization of military command, in order to assure that the party can exercise absolute, direct leadership in all regards over the armed forces.

During the General Uprising of August 1945, every place mobilized the people to arise and gain political power and organized self-defense and Liberation Army forces. In many places the armed forces were led by party cadres, but in some places they were led by bad elements. The task of unifying the command of the armed forces was very urgent, but at first difficulties were encountered because the above-mentioned situation easily led to the phenomena of localism, partialism, dispersion, and division, which often occur in the course of revolutions.

However, in our country during that period President Ho promptly organized the military command and leadership in order to achieve unified command and firm control of the army.

The general Staff, as called for by the instructions of President Ho, was rapidly formed and promptly took firm control of the army throughout the nation.

The Political Department immediately began to build up the party organization within the army. Many party members and Youth Union members were assigned to the units. Many people matured in the army and were admitted into the party. The party committee echelons began to be formed.

During the very first days of the democratic republican regime, President Ho and our party carried out a very fierce struggle to maintain political power and to maintain the right to lead and command the army.

The Chinese nationalist expansionists sent in 200,000 troops to occupy the northern part of our country and exerted the greatest possible pressure to

force us to reserve the important positions in the Government, especially in the Ministry of National Defense, for their lackeys, thus creating conditions for them to control the army and proceed to overthrowing the people's regime.

Although we allowed the "Vietnamese Nationalist Party" and the "Revolutionary Party" -- lackeys of the Chinese -- to control some ministries, we adamantly refused to allow them to control the Ministry of National Defense. We agreed to assign the position of Minister of National Defense to a patriotic figure, but stipulated that the Ministry of National Defense was responsible for military personnel and for materiel. Command of the army was assigned to the "Resistance War Council" (called in brief the "Military Council"). The Chairman of the Military Council was comrade Vo Nguyen Giap. Although Vu Hong Khanh was Vice-Chairman, the staff organs of the Military Council -- the General Staff and the Political Department -- were controlled by our party.

The self-defense forces were still part of the Viet Minh Front, i.e. they were led by the party.

Due to its clever method of resolving the problem, in actuality the party continued to lead and command the armed forces, which were a sharp instrument for maintaining political power and waging the sacred resistance war against the French colonialist aggressors.

In November 1946, when the troops of Chiang Kai-shek had to withdraw, their lackey armed forces were eliminated and the "Revolutionary Party" and "Nationalist Party" were expelled from the government. President Ho and the Party Central Committee decided to combine the Ministry of National Defense and the Military Council into the Ministry of National Defense - High Command so that our party could exercise complete leadership, command, and management, and meet the army's material needs.

That signified a great victory in the consolidation and strengthening of the party's leadership over the army, in order to mobilize the entire population to participate in the national resistance war.

In Nam Bo, after we won political power there were deficiencies in the organization of our armed forces. Some units were controlled by the other factions, and other units were controlled by the religious sect reactionaries, Trotskyites, and intelligence agents. The Communist Party was not yet able to firmly control the armed forces. That led to the situation of the resistance war not being carried out resolutely in some places. Some units were defeated, and some elements even surrendered to the enemy.

Our party had to promptly uncover and correct that situation. At the Nam Bo Party Cadre Conference held at Thien Ho on 25 October 1945, comrade Le Duan criticized those mistakes and emphasized that the party must firmly control the army. The Party Central Committee decided to keep the comrades

who had just been released from prison on Con Dao in Nam Bo in order to strengthen the party's leadership of the various sectors, especially of the army. Furthermore, President Ho's orders to divide Nam Bo into three military zones, assign cadres who had been resolute in resisting the French to head them, and gradually eliminate the bad elements, speculators, and vacillators from the army were promptly carried out.

Therefore, the resistance war in Nam Bo was able to develop solidly.

From the foregoing, it is clear that in order to ensure absolute, direct leadership of the armed forces in all regards, it was necessary not only to have strong party work and political work, but also to have a staff organ that was strong and was skilled at organization, training, and command. The staff organ was a military organ of the party, of the proletarian class, and of the "mass organization," as Uncle Ho had directed.

Engles realized that it was necessary to have a General Staff of the proletarian class. He said, "It is necessary to immediately equip the whole proletarian class with rifles, carbines, artillery; and it is necessary to oppose the restoration of specialized militia units used to oppose the workers. In places in which that cannot be done, the workers must seek ways to organize independent proletarian militia units, with commanders and commands they themselves select, which do not answer to the state administration but take orders only from the local Revolutionary Councils set up by the workers." (3)

Under the specific historical circumstances of our people's revolutionary struggle President Ho, on the basis of those immortal thoughts of Engles, promptly and effectively organized and created the General Staff of the People's Army.

Throughout the past 35 years, our General Staff has been an effective staff organ, the command organ of the Commander in Chief, the Political Bureau and the Central Military Party Committee. It fully executes all resolutions, orders, and directives of the Political Bureau and the Central Military Party Committee.

The staff organs that have been organized at the various echelons are effective command organs which assist the party commissioners and the commanders.

Although at first we knew nothing about staff work because our colony had been a disarmed colony for a long time and did not inherit the staff of the former regime the cadres, carrying out the directives of President Ho, went all-out to learn on the job, and the system of staff organs gradually came of age. We developed from a staff organ of guerrilla war to the staff organ of an army composed mainly of infantry which defeated the French imperialists, and then became the staff organ of an army made up of many modern

combat arms and armed support branches, which defeated the imperialist ring-leader -- the U.S. -- and the expansionists within the Beijing ruling circles.

Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and President Ho, and under the direct leadership of the Central Military Party Committee, our system of staff organs matched with with the experienced, cunning, wily staff organs of the powerful French and U.S. imperialists and reactionaries and the Beijing separatists, and won glorious victories over them.

At present, our people's armed forces, implementing the resolution of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, are taking a great leap forward on the path of building a professional, modern army with rational organization, voluntary, strict, iron discipline, and modern weapons and equipment. They are mastering military science and technology and gaining a firm grasp of the strategy and tactics of people's war to defend the homeland, in order to smash all plots of the enemy aggressors, defend every inch of the sacred soil of the socialist Vietnamese homeland, fulfill their international obligations, and contribute worthily to the revolutionary undertaking of the world's people, as Secretary General Le Quan directed on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the army. That task demands that the staff organs firmly grasp the characteristics and requirements of the new situation; grasp the political and military lines of the party, grasp modern military science and technology, and rapidly improve their work method and work style in order to meet the requirements of people's war to defend the homeland in the new phase.

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the day President Ho ordered the setting up of the General Staff, our staff organs at the various echelons, along with the entire population, pledge that they will correctly carry out the fundamental directives and teachings of our beloved Uncle Ho, exert themselves to study, and continually raise their levels, in order to be worthy of being the secret military organ of the "main organization," the headquarters of the army, and build a strong army, train troops valiantly, firmly withstand the enemy and ourselves, employ clever strategies, and organize uninterrupted, secret, responsive, prompt, and accurate combat, in order to build staff organs that are strong and unified, and are worthy of the resourceful, creative, heroic, and indomitable Vietnamese people.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

COOPERATION BETWEEN MAIN-FORCE UNITS, MILITIA STRESSED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHUAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Sep 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Unity and Cooperation Between the Main-Force Troops and the Self-Defense Militia"]

[Text] Our people's armed forces have very fine traditions, are always united, cooperate closely, assist one another, and create conditions for one another to brilliantly fulfill the missions assigned by the party and state.

Today, the enterprise of defending the homeland and our country's socialist construction demands that we build both a powerful, regular modern standing army and extensive reserve forces, which are well organized and trained and have increasingly greater combat strength. In the battlefield position of people's war to defend the homeland, large numbers of self-defense militia in all parts of the nation play a very important strategic role. Building strong self-defense militia forces is not only the direct responsibility of the party committees, governmental administrations, military organs, and people in the localities, and is also the permanent responsibility of the regular troops stationed in the locality.

The main-force units stationed in the localities, whether at the front or in the rear, must have specific plans for participating in the development and consolidation of self-defense militia in the hamlets, villages, construction sites, enterprises, and organs in their area of operations. In places in which the self-defense militia are still weak, the regular units stationed there may assign cadres who are skilled in leadership, organization and command, and who are well prepared, to work with the local cadres in developing and training the basic units of the self-defense militia.

The commanders and staff organs of the regular units are responsible for taking the initiative in helping the cadres commanding the self-defense militia draft or supplement operational plans, coordinating the operational plans of the regular troops with those of the self-defense militia, and guiding the self-defense militia in attaining combat readiness and in organizing independent combat maneuvers or maneuvers coordinated with regular troops in accordance with the plans that have been drafted.

Positively participating in the training of self-defense militia is a responsibility of the cadres commanding regular units stationed in the localities which cannot be taken lightly. The most important thing is to concentrate on improving the ability to organize combat command of and the contents and methods of training, the base-level self-defense militia cadres, so that they may rapidly assume responsibility for commanding, managing, and training their units.

If they are to do a truly good job in assisting in the training and development of self-defense militia, the units must reach agreement with the local military organs regarding contents and plans for assigning people to assist each self-defense militia unit. The local military organs in the provinces and municipalities assigned missions to the regular units and organs under their control and guided them in carrying out their work, while taking the initiative in setting specific requirements for the regular units operating in the localities, organizing conferences or short courses, and improving the work contents and methods of the regular cadres and troops who are assigned to help the self-defense militia units. At regular times, or after a particular task has been carried out, the cadres commanding main-force units and local military organs organize criticism of the tasks that have been carried out in order to improve quality and work efficiency.

To do a good job of helping train and develop the self-defense militia is to contribute in a practical way to increasing the strength of national defense by all the people at the basic level, increasing the strength of local people's war and, along with the main-force units creating the great combined strength of people's war to defend the homeland.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPROVEMENT OF COMMAND CADRES, ORGANS URGED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 80 pp 6-11

[Article by Colonel General Le Trong Tan: "Raise the Command Organization of the Command Cadres and Command Organs of the Units"]

[Text] In improving the quality of the troops, improving the quality of the command cadres and command organs, especially raising the command organization level of the commanders and command organs of the units, is especially important. Only skilled commanders can develop the greatest possible strength of the units in the strong battlefield position of people's war to defend the homeland. In actuality, it is clear that in some cases a unit retains the same personnel, organization, and material bases, but the mere change of command cadres brings about an important new transformation throughout that unit.

On the basis of the present requirements and missions, and the actual level of the cadres, in raising the command organization level of the command cadres and command organs of the units we must concentrate on improving their ability to organize command of coordinated combat by combat arms and armed forces branches on all scales, especially on medium and large scales, in order to strongly and promptly counterattack the aggressor troops as soon as they transgress the territory of our homeland.

In war to defend the socialist homeland, our soldiers and people must retaliate for the aggressive attacks launched by enemy troops against our country from across the border, just as soon as they start a war, in the border area, on the islands, and along the coast of the homeland. In that time and space, the fighting between ourselves and the enemy takes place in an urgent, fierce, and complicated manner, and has decisive significance with regard to the over-all development of the war. The main-force units of the combat arms and armed forces branches must coordinate closely with one another, in order to create great strength with which to strongly and promptly retaliate against aggressive attacks by large enemy forces from many directions. Therefore, the command cadres and command organs at all echelons must be skilled at organization and command at their echelon and

understand the organization and command of the upper echelon; victoriously fight coordinated combat arms and armed forces branches battles and campaigns on medium and large scales as soon as the enemy troops set foot on the border area, sea islands, and coasts of our country; fiercely intercept and fight the enemy, divide and surround them, strike large-scale annihilating blows against them, and smash their aggressive attacks.

On the basis of firmly grasping our Army's basic guidance thoughts and principles regarding coordinated combat in war to defend the homeland, the commanders and command organs of the units must firmly grasp the missions, functions, and principles of using and coordinating the combat arms and technical armed forces branches. They must understand the basic techniques and tactics of artillery, tanks, the various kinds of infantry combat vehicles, the various kinds of combat aircraft, the various kinds of anti-aircraft artillery and missiles, the various kinds of ships and boats, the facilities for assuring mobility and command, etc. That is necessary if they are to rapidly and accurately organize coordination in battles and campaigns of all scales, fully develop the strength of the combined units, armed forces branches, and combat arms, and of the various kinds of modern weapons and technical equipment in the course of battles and campaigns. These cadres and organs must be skilled at the methods of organizing coordination with the participation of many armed forces branches and forces. The methods of coordinating in map exercises, on sand tables, and on real battlefields; coordinating according to the missions, objectives, times, and locations; coordination among the combat arms and armed forces branches; coordination with the local armed forces in accordance with the basic battle or campaign, etc., must be applied flexibly and creatively, in a manner appropriate to the missions and within the allowable time. At the same time, the command cadres must know how to apply those methods in order to maintain and rapidly restore coordination among the armed forces branches, the combat arms, and the other forces in the developmental process of campaigns and battles. The command cadres and command organs must be trained very specifically and meticulously regarding matters related to the techniques of large-scale coordination, such as pointing out objectives to one another, reporting positions and situations, calling in fire, deciding on signals of the various kinds, assuring coordinated communications, determining mobility roads, organizing traffic control on the roads and at the truck depots, etc.

The command cadres and command organs of the units must train in order to exercise correct, prompt, uninterrupted and continuous command under all circumstances. They must be capable of collecting, analysing, and acting upon accurately and promptly a very great volume of information in the course of battle, especially during the first days of a war. They must know how to make accurate decisions, while at the same time rapidly organizing the scientific and prompt implementation of those decisions, in a manner appropriate to the urgent development of the combat situation on the battlefield. The commanders and the command organs must be able to organize strong, clear command systems on a large scale and covering a large area, by combining the information facilities and modes. Training

must also be given in the methods of relaying operational orders and directives so that they can be relayed accurately, clearly, specifically, and promptly to many different locations, combat arms, and forces.

The coordination of the combat of modern armed forces branches and combat arms under fierce, complicated conditions demands very good ability to assure rear services and technical facilities. The units fight continually and consume increasingly greater quantities of weapons, ammunition, food, and materiel. Therefore, the command cadres and command organs must be able to organize a strong, complete, and unified system to assure rear services and technical facilities. That system must have large supply reserves that are sufficient to assure continuous consumption, in order to maintain continuous fighting strength at the front and also have reserve forces and strong mobility in order to promptly provide reinforcements for the battles and campaigns at the important fronts, and complete and convenient supply, repair, and transportation bases. That demands that the command cadres and organs commanding the units continually improve their theoretical knowledge and ability to organize in order to assure rear services and technical facilities in modern warfare.

The commanders and command organs must be able to skilfully organize and command coordinate combat by combat arms in all types of terrain and in many different directions, all at the same time. In war to defend the homeland, coordinated combat arms battles and campaigns may take place in the mountains, along the coast, at sea, and on islands, in order to promptly counterattack the enemy as soon as they launch aggressive attacks against the territory of our homeland. In the developmental process of a war, coordinated combat may take place in the mountains, in the lowlands, and in the area of cities and towns. Sometimes coordinated combat may take place on many different kinds of terrain in the same strategic area. The organization and command of coordinated combat have different requirements in each type of terrain. Therefore, the command cadres and command organs must have basic knowledge of the organization and command of combat on all kinds of terrain, not only on the mainland but at times simultaneously on the land, at sea, and in the air. They must be capable of organizing the good implementation of the tasks of studying and preparing the battlefield, preparing forces, and the various aspects of assuring materiel, in order to utilize such armed forces branches and combat arms as artillery, tanks and armor, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, the various kinds of combat aircraft and warships, combat engineers, etc., in order to develop high effectiveness and strong combat strength on all kinds of terrain and in all kinds of weather, in areas in which the road networks are very poor, etc.

The combat missions of the main-force units in war to defend the homeland demand that the command cadres and command organs truly master the use of various kinds of modern weapons and technical equipment in every kind of terrain. With regard to each different kind of terrain, the command cadres and command organs must have methods for utilizing the armed forces branches

and technical combat arms, have ways to rationally deploy coordinated formations, have methods for effectively commanding coordinated combat, and have methods for assuring the mobility, rear services, and technical facilities, so that the units can fight continually with the greatest possible strength.

The command cadres and command organs must be able to skilfully organize and command the various tactical and campaign forms in war to defend the homeland.

The cadres must be educated so that they can be capable of organizing and commanding coordinated combat arms battles and campaigns; achieve high combat effectiveness in counterattacks, in attacks, and on the defensive; annihilate the enemy troops as soon as they arrive; and stoutly defend the nation's rear area. The commanders of troops, units, and combat arms must know how to use combat arms and armed forces branches in each tactical and campaign form in each combat mode, and many combat forms at the same time, in order to create the greatest combined strength with which to smash the strategic and tactical measures taken by the enemy and achieve increasingly higher combat effectiveness.

The basic requirement of coordinated combat in counterattacks and attacks is to create a great assault force, strong firepower, and a high degree of mobility in order to attack and counterattack the enemy troops with the greatest strength and at the greatest rate of speed, and annihilate large segments of the enemy troops in the briefest period of time. While on the defensive, the coordinated combat of the units must meet the requirements of solid, positive defense, taking the initiative in fighting the enemy from afar, defend the battlefield under all circumstances, closely combine defense with offense and offense with defense, continually counterattack and attack the enemy troops, and rapidly change over to counterattacks and attacks in order to completely annihilate the enemy. On the basis of the above requirements, we must train the command cadres and command organs to firmly grasp and victoriously implement the principles of coordinated combat, utilize the armed forces and combat arms, organize the combat formations and coordinated combat, organize command, and assure the aspects, in order to be appropriate to each combat form.

One of the special characteristics of war to defend the homeland is that the units must fight continually on a large area with many combat stratagems and many new campaign forms. Therefore, the command cadres and command organs at the various echelons must be able to combine the operational form to another. That is a matter of closely combining counterattacks with attacks and defense with offense, and of changing over from defense to counterattacks and attacks. On it is a matter of changing from assaults to encirclement, and vice versa, of changing over from attacking and counterattacking the enemy while the enemy are maneuvering to attacking them while they are in fortified defensive networks, etc. The units must also effectively use the various tactical and combat forms against enemy troops landing from the sea, opposing enemy troops attacking with airplanes or missiles, landing by air, etc.

The correct, creative utilization of the tactical forms and the formula of coordinated combat arms operations in order to win victory in battles and campaigns is a result of the very great subjective efforts of all command cadres and command organs. For that reason, it is necessary to continually educate the cadres and improve their organizational and command ability. It is necessary to mobilize on the part of cadres a spirit of wanting to study military, political, military scientific-technical, and other subjects, closely combining the training mission with combat, and unit training with tactical and campaign training, on the part of command organs and command cadres.

One of the very basic requirements is that the command cadres and command organs must be capable of organizing and commanding close cooperation with the on-the-spot forces of local people's war. In people's war to defend the homeland, we must closely combine war fought by main-force units and local people's war. That combination is manifested in a very rich, lively, and specific manner in both battles and campaigns. Only by achieving that combination can the main-force units develop their strength.

Therefore, the command cadres and command organs must fully understand the functions, missions, organization, combat capability, tactical form, combat stratagems, etc., of the local armed forces. They must have complete and profound understanding of those basic matters. When they have a mission in a certain area, province, municipalities, and districts, the commanders and command organs commanding units must take the initiative in studying and gaining understanding of the combat missions of the localities; the defensive and offensive plans, and the operational plans, of the local armed forces; the terrain, difficulties, and advantages of the localities, etc. On that basis, the commanders and command organs of units must take the initiative in unifying the combat plans of the units and those of the local armed forces. The important matter is that the unit commanders must be resolute and responsive in coordinating actions, and closely combine the activities of the local forces in each area and in each location, according to the specific objectives and circumstances, in order to create the greatest strength with which to fight the enemy and fulfill missions.

In the course of campaigns and battles, the unit commanders and command organs must promptly report the situation, and their decisions and actions, to the local armed forces; promptly act to provide effective aid and assistance so that those forces can operate effectively. They must fully utilize and fully develop the advantages of local people's war in the deployment of formations, in utilizing forces, in utilizing combat stratagems and the various types of campaigns, in assuring rear services, in assuring technical facilities, etc.

The unit command organ is the center for organizing coordinated combat among the forces, combat arms, and armed forces branches; it organizes the implementation of the combat decisions and coordinated combat orders of the commander. The ability to grasp the principles of coordinated

combat, the level of basic and all-round understanding of modern military science and technology; good staff skills, and professional work styles and methods are the factors which determine the quality of the work of unit command organs. Therefore, in addition to training command cadres we must pay all-out attention to training the command organs. Skilled command cad cadres must build strong command organs.

The command organ cadres must be trained comprehensively, basically, and systematically regarding our army's coordinated combat system. The cadres in charge of specialized sectors of the command organs must firmly grasp the functions, missions, and specialized contents of the sectors which they head, such as the operational, military intelligence, communications, artillery, combat engineer, and other sectors, etc. More than anyone else, those comrades must truly become skilled "specialists" regarding organization, coordination techniques, and the use of modern weapons and technical equipment in order to help the commanders react and command accurately and rapidly. The cadres in each sector of the command must be trained meticulously, in order to grasp and expertly carry out their functions and missions in close relations with the other cadres and elements. Training must also be given to achieve professional expertise in preparing documents and organizing the various steps of preparing for and carrying out combat, inspections, supervision, and assisting the units, in accordance with unified programs, contents, and requirements.

Each sector, as well as the command organs at each echelon, must create good work practices and a scientific work order, in order to be appropriate to the laws of organizing and waging modern campaigns and battles. Combined combat arms and armed forces branches operations demand that all activities of the command organs must be highly accurate, planned, scientific, urgent, and specific. We must oppose careless, arbitrary, and scattered working methods, which easily result in mistakes, confusion, and duplication, in coordination among the combat arms and armed forces branches, and avoid unnecessary losses. Therefore, it is necessary to train the command organs at the various echelons so that they may have good, unified work practices and assure that the command organs always make recommendations that have sufficient objective bases and are capable of organizing combat accurately and urgently, in a manner appropriate to the intentions of the commanders, fully understand the situation of troops in combat, and guide, inspect, and supervise the troops in carrying out all orders and instructions of commanders strictly, specifically, and accurately.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT URGED

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[Article by Major General Hoang Van Thai: "Improve the Effectiveness of Military Technical Management"]

[Text] For many years now military technical management, because of the development of military science and technology, and because of the increasingly larger-scale utilization of relatively modern and modern weapons and technical facilities, has become a very important matter in increasing the combat strength of our armed forces. It is an indispensable part of military management.

Our army's management work and system of technical organization and management have become increasingly complete and have begun to operate efficiently. However, that is a major problem, one with a scientific nature, that must be continually perfected and made more effective. The greater the effectiveness of technical management, the greater role the material-technical bases will be and the more positively they will contribute to increasing the combat strength of our armed forces.

I. Firmly Grasp the New Characteristics and Requirements of Military Technical Management

The most outstanding characteristic is that the scope of military technical management has been greatly expanded because of the strong development of our armed forces' organization and equipment. At the same time, the quality of military technical management must be continually improved, because the material-technical bases that must be managed include many different kinds of equipment, weapons, instruments, and war facilities, and those of which that are modern account for a rather large and increasingly greater percentage.

With regard to the regular troops, the scope of technical management has been expanded in comparison with the years of the anti-U.S. war. With regard to reserve forces and the militia and self-defense forces, that scope of management has been expanded even more. If in the past we paid much attention to technical management in the regular army, today we

continue to do so and do a better job, but at the same time we must realize that technical management in the reserve forces and the self-defense militia has become a very great, permanent task. It is evident that our ability to maintain, repair, and produce many types of modern equipment, weapons, and instruments is still limited. Therefore, it is even more important that there be a new transformation in our way of considering the objects, contents, and methods of organization and management, and must also pay attention to improving the troops' scientific-technical and military technology knowledge. We must create a corps of cadres, enlisted men, and technical personnel who are capable of fulfilling the missions and responsibilities of the technical sectors. We must strictly implement the orders and regulations, and professionalize the management activities in order to improve the effectiveness of management and rapidly study and apply the regulations, systems, and policies so that they may be appropriate to management in each force, each type of troops, etc.

Another characteristic, and also a new, very important requirement, is that the military technical management work must serve the great task of consolidating national defense and preparing to victoriously wage people's war to defend the homeland against the Chinese aggressors, in alliance with the U.S. imperialists and the other reactionaries. The great task of consolidating national defense by all the people and people's war to defend our homeland has many points in common with, and also many points that are different from, the previous liberation wars. Today, our military art must undergo very rich developmental steps. Those matters must be fully understood in the military technical management work.

The war which we must carry out in the new period, if the enemy foolhardily starts one, will be a people's war to defend the socialist homeland under the conditions of our people having gained mastery over their entire country. It has new, very demanding requirements, but there are also new, very great capabilities in the sphere of assuring military technology. With our technical equipment we are capable of detecting the enemy from afar, setting up a strong battlefield position, and rapidly moving forces to the battlefield, over different kinds of terrain, communicate and command under all climatic and weather conditions, etc. Those technical facilities are extremely valuable and must be well managed in order to fully develop their use in the enterprise of defending the homeland.

Military technology must help our armed forces achieve mastery and attack, attack and achieve mastery, throughout the nation and in each locality, especially in the strategic areas, in order to assure that our armed forces are deployed not only in advantageous areas but also in areas with many difficulties. It must assure that the various kinds of campaigns -- attacks, counterattacks, and the defensive -- of the main-force units, the local people's armed forces, and the mobile and on-the-spot forces. With regard to the main-force units, it is necessary to pay attention to assuring the uniformity of technical equipment and improving the troops' mobility. But with regard to the local armed forces in the defensive zones and

strongpoints it is also necessary to continually assure a very high degree of technical combat-readiness, pay attention to maintaining weapons and equipment, and promptly study and improve equipment so that it is appropriate to the requirements of combat.

We must concentrate on the matters necessary to assure technical equipment, stockpile technical equipment, and organize the truly rational use of weapons and technical facilities, in order to maintain a high degree of combat readiness and contribute positively to further improve the solidity of the defensive system and assure sources of prompt supply for combat. We must do a good job of maintaining, using, and restoring the existing weapons and technical facilities, and positively manage the national defense industrial system, in order to assure a basic, long-range source of supply of weapons and technical facilities for national defense by all the people and people's war to defend the homeland. We must assure that the military technical activities go in the right direction and that plans be drafted to build up the economic, military, and scientific-technical potential of the nation, that national defense be closely combined with the economy and the economy with national defense, and that both the immediate requirements and the long-range requirements of the enterprise of building and defending the homeland be met.

Therefore, from grasping the objects of management and carrying out the contents of management to applying the management methods we must fully understand the military science and technology of people's war to defend the homeland, and assure that we can build, consolidate, and develop the powerful battlefield position of people's war effectively under the different conditions, in order to contribute to building and developing the greatest possible combined strength with which to defeat the enemy under all circumstances.

II. Correctly Determine the Objects of Management and Implement in a Balanced Manner the Contents of Management

The military material-technical bases, and the system of equipment, weapons, and war facilities of the armed forces are very important objects of military technical management. But they are not the only objects. The most difficult objects of management, with the most complex relationships, are the people and organizations that directly maintain technical facilities, the forces which engage in technical research, maintain technical facilities, and use technical facilities in the armed forces. Those objects are the forces which directly implement the management contents and assure the ultimate effectiveness of the military technical management work. Therefore, in collecting, analyzing, and acting on information in management, first of all it is necessary to collect, analyze, and act on information regarding the latter objects. Military technical management must enter more deeply into the people using technical facilities and the technical organizations, in order to attain the goals and requirements that have been set.

In accordance with their functions and missions, everyone using technical facilities and all technical organizations have a certain operational environment and are affected by that environment. The principal environment of the broad masses of cadres and enlisted men -- the people who directly use technical facilities in combat -- is the battlefield, during life-or-death combat with the enemy troops. The principal environment of the comrades engaged in scientific-technical research consists of the schools, institutes, research bases, and research laboratories. As for the people who maintain technical facilities and repair weapons and equipment, the principal environment consists of the defense workshops, stations, enterprises, and factories. In such environments each force, cadre, and enlisted man learns, accumulates experience, and creates strengths in their spheres of activity, but also reveals weaknesses and deficiencies, including professional weaknesses, which we must be concerned with overcoming. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly categorize, and enter deeply into the characteristics and roles of, each objective, in order to set forth directions and implementation measures for each requirement and for all requirements of military technical management.

Military technology is continually developing. That is manifest even in our own armed forces. Due to that development, the technical level of today cannot be sufficient for all future periods. Success in using technical facilities by one force or another in one instance or another does not necessarily mean success for all forces in all instances. A technical innovation for coping with a certain enemy in a certain war may not be sufficient to cope with other enemies in other wars. Therefore, when examining the objectives and collecting, analyzing, and acting on information in the various spheres of military technical management, it is necessary to be extremely objective, comprehensive, meticulous, and specific, with truly ample evaluation of the strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, and roles of each force, and we must always adhere closely to the new requirements of the military technical work in national defense by all the people and in modern people's war to defend the homeland.

With regard to all forces, whether they are engaged in research in military science and technology, or maintain or use technical facilities, the cadres, enlisted men, workers, and personnel who are directly involved with technology and are engaged in technical management in our armed forces, must be trained in accordance with the common requirements. They must be fortified with regard to revolutionary thinking and sentiment and have the necessary knowledge in many fields. They must also be tempered in actual combat. All must sincerely love our regime, love their compatriots and comrades, love research, go all-out in serving the troops, and diligently undertake political, military, and military science and technology training. They must hate ignorance, disorganization, indiscipline, and arrogance, deceit, and laziness, which exert an adverse influence on technical research and on the maintenance and use of technical facilities.

The actual operations of our armed forces increasingly demonstrate that military technical management is a matter of science, technology, and art, that it is a leadership and command task at all echelons and a common task of the army, not merely of the technical sectors. It must be tied in with political and military management, be tied in with military training and political education, and create a good state of mind and good traditions for the troops.

The over-all contents of military technical management are manifested in many respects: being informed of the quantity and quality of weapons and equipment, organizing and managing technical maintenance, managing the use of technical facilities, technical research, and national defense production.

In managing material-technical bases, no matter at what level, all units must have definite, accurate knowledge of the quantity and quality of their equipment, by means of all organizational measures, in order to assure that their weapons and equipment remain in good condition and in a high state of combat readiness. Modern military technical facilities consist not only of individual items but also of combined systems, and there is an increasingly closer tie between weapons and equipment on the one hand and combat-support technical facilities on the other hand. Therefore, in managing material-technical bases we cannot pay attention only to combat technical facilities, equipment, and weapons, but must also do a good job of managing combat-support technical facilities and support equipment. The complicated nature of maintenance in our country's tropical environment must be fully realized, and on that basis it is necessary to study, guide, and organize ways to keep all types of technical facilities from being downgraded for a long time, extend their lives, and, when required by the fighting, rapidly bring them into use with a low failure rate and with good quality. The dynamics and creativity of the management of material-technical bases are also manifested in thorough understanding of the nature and military art of war to defend the homeland, and in researching in order to contribute to completing technical equipping and technical utilization in the most appropriate, beneficial manner.

The management of technical support requires first of all that we promptly recognize the new requirements regarding the storage, maintenance, and repair of military weapons and equipment that are posed by the nature and level of the equipment of the armed forces, the army's use of that equipment in combat readiness and combat, and the special characteristics of war to defend the homeland. It must contribute positively to the process of creating, maintaining, and consolidating a balance between the use and repair of weapons and equipment, and between the consumption and supplying of material-technical means, on the basis of the conditions and capabilities of the nation and the army. Therefore, in management there must be full evaluation of the tasks involved in producing spare parts and equipment, and in repairing weapons and equipment. We must further the rapid improvement of the production and repair capabilities and quality of the

actively improve enterprises and factories, and assure that they contribute positively and in a timely manner to improving the technical facilities of our armed forces. We must also enter into the spheres of organization, division of labor, and decentralization in all storage, maintenance, repair, stockpiling, and supply systems of the units, combat arms, armed forces branches, and the various kinds of troops in the rear and at the front, in order to assure that our armed forces in the various areas, directions, and localities, especially on the front lines of the homeland, have sufficient high-quality weapons and technical facilities with which to defeat the enemy troops under all circumstances.

The management of weapons and technical facilities use is a sphere of management which is tied in very closely with the enlisted masses, with the large and small collectives, the units and localities, and the forces engaged directly in combat and serving combat. Management must be able to grasp the strengths and weaknesses in activities involving the use of weapons and technical facilities by each component, combat arm, armed forces branch, force, and type of troops, and by that means contribute to setting forth guidelines for the most rational and economical utilization, and supervise the process of implementing these guidelines. The effectiveness of management lies in the fact that it furthers the use of weapons and technical facilities in correct accordance with their specifications, capabilities, and intended use, raises their utilization the status of an art, and assures that all utilization processes are very effective, highly efficient, very economical, and not wasteful. Managing the utilization of weapons and technical facilities is a task that is intimately related to troop management. In the course of actual combat it contributes directly to setting forth the education and training requirements and contents, in order to improve the combat skills, and military and technical levels, of the troops. It promptly uncovers, and points out to the units and localities, negative phenomena in the use of weapons and technical facilities, and struggles resolutely against, and takes all steps to stop, those phenomena.

The management of military science and technology must develop the capabilities of the research cadres and technical personnel, arrange for the results to enter promptly into military science and technology, positively get military science and technology onto the right track, in accordance with plans that have been decided upon, and increase the guidance and effectiveness of the research processes. A very basic matter with regard to management is guiding all research activities in the right direction and in accordance with the viewpoints toward scientific-technical development that were brought forth during the Fourth Party Congress, thus contributing effectively and efficiently carrying out the scientific-technical revolution in the armed forces. It must assure the necessary level of concentration on research in order to grasp the enemy's technology, fully utilize the capabilities of our technology, resolve the problems regarding maintenance, repair, and the production of spare parts for the existing weapons and technical equipment, and produce appropriate weapons and war facilities in order to defeat the war of aggression of the Chinese reactionaries. It

must carry out research projects, strengthen the scientific information work, carry out scientific-technical cooperation, and create for us increasingly strong military/scientific-technical potential, in accordance with the long-range requirements of the enterprise of building and defending the homeland. It must develop, build, and perfect research organizations and bases, and the regulations and policies regarding research, so that they may be appropriate to the regulations of the state and our army's organization, equipment, and missions; in order to create conditions for research management to be put solidly onto the right track.

Management of the production of equipment, weapons, and military technical facilities is a common task of the socialist state, is carried out under the unified guidance of the Council of Ministers, and is intended to strengthen the responsibility and capability of all economic and industrial sectors, in order to produce weapons and equipment for the armed forces. Therefore, management of the national defense production bases requires very great efforts, first of all the fulfillment of plans with regard to both quantity and quality. Therefore, management must take the initiative in treating a strong transformation in all spheres. It must meet the requirements regarding the product quality of military technical facilities and achieve, gradually and solidly, standardization, specialization, and cooperativization, in order to resolve problems regarding the production and repair of weapons and technical equipment. It must endeavor to improve labor organization, improve techniques, apply new technology, and pay adequate attention to the economic aspects of national defense activities, in order to increase the effectiveness, and assure the economic efficiency of national defense production bases.

The program and results of the achievement of the above contents are interrelated and affect one another. These interrelationships become even tighter and that mutual influence becomes even stronger as the armed forces become larger, as their equipment is strengthened, as the national defense requirements become higher, and as the scale of fighting becomes greater. Therefore, at present, now more than ever, these management contents must be implemented in a truly harmonious, balanced nature. The real effectiveness of each of these contents is judged in the over-all context of all the management contents. Any delay in achieving one of these contents can reduce the over-all effectiveness of management.

None of these management contents can be achieved by any one force or component alone but can only be the result of a sense of responsibility and ability to act on the part of all sectors, echelons, units, combat arms, and armed forces branches in our armed forces. However, although each echelon and unit has its own sphere of authority and responsibility, on the basis of the specific situation and mission, during each period of time they concentrate on individual problems and contents.

Therefore, it is necessary to view the over-all management situation, point out the correct aspects that must be continued, promptly uncover the

mistaken that must be rectified and, in the course of actual management, concentrate on the most important areas in order to create a transformation in management and improve its effectiveness.

III. Do a Good Job of Applying the Management Measures

The creative application of management measures, especially the organizational-administrative measures and the use of scientific knowledge and technical facilities in management, has a direct role, like that of an effective tool, in strongly affecting the objectives and in fulfilling the contents and requirements of management.

Strengthening the organizational-administrative measures is very essential at present, for our armed forces have greatly developed with regard to both organization and equipment, and are undergoing professional, modern development and carry out a movement for the entire army to act in accordance with orders. We must stabilize and consolidate the technical organizations and organs so that they may be appropriate to the new situation and missions of the revolution and the army. These organizations and organs, no matter whether at the strategic, campaign, or tactical level, whether in the infantry or in the technical combat arms and armed force branches, and whether of the regular army or the local forces, are organized in accordance with the requirements of the missions. It is necessary to clearly determine their functions, missions, responsibilities, and relationships, and to supply them with the facilities they need to operate. If that is to be accomplished, we must be concerned with creating and cultivating a corps of technical cadres and personnel to keep up with the new requirements of the missions. They must be well-qualified and capable and represent the different sectors and professions, with appropriate ratios among the research, repair, storage, maintenance, and weapons and equipment sectors, so that the cadres may be fully qualified to operate effectively in the new situation. In that regard, we must not limit ourselves to organizing units, raising levels, improving skills, etc., but also resolve problems regarding systems and policies in a fundamental, comprehensive manner, in order to, by that means, create stable, powerful, long-range technical forces for our armed forces.

Since military technical management is a whole system of activities which includes many contents, objectives, and relationships, and important matter is the maintenance of managerial unity by means of division of labor and decentralization with regard to each content and all contents of management, thus assuring that each division, sector, combat arm, and type of troop operates with the greatest possible capability in order to meet the requirements of their missions and operational characteristics. Division of labor and decentralization carried out in the spheres of utilization, maintenance, technical research, etc., must be intended to increase the effectiveness of management. We must develop the responsibility of each organization and component and create increasingly greater ability to act independently in resolving problems regarding storage, maintenance, repair, etc., according to the level of each sector and echelon. We must fully

raise the capabilities and strength of each organization and component in the resolution of military technical problems started by the entire army. In that sense, we must improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical work in the armed forces, and avoid duplication, talking round about ways, or failing to fully utilize the capabilities and capacities of people and technical facilities.

The time has come when we must undergo a strong transformation along the lines of planning, standardization, and specialization in all spheres and contents of military technical management.

In order to get military technical management activities onto a professional footing, we must first of all promote the fulfillment of missions and responsibilities of each sector, echelon, and person; stress management by means of regulations, systems, and stipulations; and promulgate, and implement throughout the army, regulations regarding technical maintenance, technical research, the management of national defense enterprises, etc.

Commanders, from the strategic echelon to the campaign and tactical echelons, have responsibilities and authority toward military technical management, although to differing degrees and with differing contents and spheres. Those responsibilities are manifested in continually grasping the quantity, quality, and operational situation of the existing technical facilities, and in the education, training, guidance, and organization of the cadres enlisted men, and units under their command so that they maintain and effectively use weapons and equipment. They are also manifested in guiding activities regarding the stockpiling and supplementation of material and equipment, regarding the recovery and repair of weapons and facilities, regarding the carrying out of technical research, etc. Therefore, the good fulfillment of responsibilities is a very basic matter. At every echelon in the army, commanders have technical assistants. The responsibility, ability, and strengths of those comrades must be developed

All technical organizations and organs, and all technical cadres and personnel, whether in the research, storage, repair, or development sector, have their responsibilities. If they do a good job of fulfilling of those responsibilities, they will not only stimulate the technical activities but also serve as staffs for the commanders with regard to the military technical work, and therefore increase the over-all effectiveness of military technology.

In fulfilling their responsibilities regarding military technology, first of all soldiers must maintain and treasure the equipment, not allow weapons to become damaged or lost, or fall into the hands of the enemy, diligently study tactics and techniques, and use weapons and equipment expertly and with high effectiveness.

With regard to each good point and deficiency regarding the maintenance, storage, repair, and use of weapons and equipment by the troops, as well as technical resources, it is necessary to determine which person, unit, division, organization, or sector is responsible. We cannot allow the divisions, sectors, units, and forces to lean on one another or blame one another. Those units which make accomplishments must be rewarded, and those which make mistakes must be punished. We should not have the attitude that it doesn't matter whether something is done or not, or whether a job is done well or not.

Each unit, division, and of organization must do a good job of implementing the regulations, systems, and stipulations regarding military technical management, in a manner appropriate to their functions and responsibilities. There must be regulations, systems, and rules regarding the storage, maintenance, and repair of weapons and equipment. There must be regulations, systems, and rules regarding material-technical stockpiling, the use of combat facilities, and the maintenance of the ratios of combat-ready weapons under the different circumstances, and requirements regarding each type of weapons and equipment in a state of combat-readiness must be set. In addition to the carrying out of combat-readiness, the implementation of the above regulations, systems, and rules both contributes to assuring that the troops always take the initiative and help allow the management of weapons and technical facilities to be carried out effectively under all circumstances.

In addition to the organizational-administrative measures, it is necessary to positively utilize scientific knowledge and the technical facilities in military technical management activities. Since our army now has a large quantity of modern technical equipment and the system of military technical organization, the use of scientific knowledge and technical facilities in management is an urgent matter. By means of ordinary, primitive measures it is impossible to correctly and rapidly grasp the quantity and quality of the technical equipment of the units and the various kinds of troops, and it is impossible to monitor promptly and fully the military technical situation of the combat arms, the armed forces branches, the system of workshops, stations, and warehouses, and the activities of those systems.

Today, with the development of science and technology and the invention and manufacture of modern machinery, many countries have organized automated command systems and systems for guiding the rear-services work, and have built bases for and used modern equipment for investigating, probing, and communicating. Increasingly greater use has been made of mathematics, cybernetics, and acoustical, electro-mechanical, and electronic equipment in the management organs, such as electronic desk computers, rapid printers, etc. That has brought about great results in calculating, designing, construction, troop strength management, the management of equipment, materials, technical facilities, and finance, and in other professional tasks.

Therefore, in order to increase the effectiveness of military technical management under the conditions of our armed forces having developed into a vast system, we must enter into the use of scientific knowledge and technical methods in the fields of physics, chemistry, biology, and cybernetics, as well as zoology, geography, meteorology, and psychology in military science and art, etc., in all spheres of researching, manufacturing, maintaining, and using technical facilities, and managing material-technical bases. We must build and consolidate bases for management, investigation, and measurement, and use with increasing effectiveness such specialized technical facilities as computers, measuring equipment, inspecting equipment, etc., in military technical measurement. Raising the scientific-technical levels of the cadres and enlisted men and the technical personnel and technical management organs, along with ensuring that they have professional, strict, and accurate work styles, has become very important.

Of course, the application of the above-mentioned knowledge and technical measures cannot be on a wide scale, but must be done step-by-step, from a low level to a high level, in a manner appropriate to the equipment and missions of each echelon, sector, combat arm, and armed forces branch. At the same time, we still pay all-out attention to methods with which we have long been accustomed, and utilize those methods creatively and effectively under the new conditions.

In some respects, military technical management still manifests the nature of economic management activities, especially in the spheres of production and repair. Therefore, the application of economic measures and economic levers, and the gradual implementation of economic accounting in each sphere, at levels appropriate to the missions and all-round conditions of the national defense enterprises and factories and of the research bases and the research work, is also necessary to increase the effectiveness of military technical management.

At the same time, it is necessary to pay adequate attention to educational measures and to do a truly good job of the education work, in order to create and develop a spirit of mastership, a sense of responsibility, and consciousness on the part of cadres, enlisted men, technical personnel, and technical organizations.

Each of those kinds of measures has its uses. Any one type of measures alone cannot bring about the desired results in military technical management. Therefore, it is necessary to widely apply and closely combine those measures in order to create a combined strength to increase the effectiveness of military technical management.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN WORKERS' INSPECTION UNITS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Sep 80 p 3

[Article: "Workers' Inspections"]

[Text] Workers' inspection units were only established and began operating in late 1979 and early 1980. After performing only several simple jobs, these units achieved practical results and were welcomed by the masses. The decision to establish workers' inspection units was consistent with the interests and aspirations of manual workers and civil servants.

Formerly the mass inspection organization, the inspection units of workers have been given more specific authority and tasks by the government. Under decree number 182-CP, these units have the authority to request that the person in charge of the unit or an individual at the place being inspected supply necessary information on the situation, data and documentation and respond to the questions raised by the inspection unit. The unit has the authority to request that the person in charge of the unit immediately suspend the distribution of products that have clearly lost their quality, immediately rectify actions that are contrary to policies and regulations and replace scales and measuring devices that are not accurate; it also has the authority to propose commendations and awards for units and individuals that perform their task well or disciplinary action against units and individuals that purposely violate policies.

Inspections are an activity by which manual workers and civil servants participate in being the masters of society and have the purpose of helping to stop negative phenomena in distribution, circulation and the support of everyday life. To date, 24 provinces and municipalities have organized 327 worker inspection units consisting of more than 2,000 members. Participating in these units are professional cadres of the various sectors, activists in the worker control committees at installations, persons who participated in the former mass inspection organizations and a number of retired cadres who possess zeal, professional qualifications and pure qualities and have the trust of the masses.

The units have the task of inspecting the mode of distribution, the weighing and measuring practices, the spirit of service and so forth at counters, stores, a number of installations producing and processing wheat, train ticket counters, drug dispensaries and the medical examination clinics of the commerce, food, public health and communications-transportation sectors.

Through the inspection of more than 500 stores, the inspection units of workers have helped to uncover more than a few positive factors while exposing negative factors for the purpose of struggling to overcome them. Also through their scheduled and unscheduled inspections, these units have gained much experience regarding work methods, how to organize inspections, the job of conducting inspections and so forth. For example, inspection units discovered that the Quan Lau and Cua Dong Grain Stores in Vinh City had allowed cadres and personnel of the stores and within the sector to purchase 100 percent rice while cadres and workers of the other sectors had to purchase from 80 to 100 percent wheat. The Minh Khai Bicycle Store in Hanoi allowed personnel of the store to purchase all eight of the minibikes that the store had on sale and 78 of the 80 bicycle tires it had on sale. Inspections of grain stores have shown that overweighing is universal. Through an inspection of 18 grain stores in Ho Chi Minh City, 15 stores were found to be shorting customers. An inspection of three bakeries in Ho Chi Minh City showed that the average loaf of bread was 30 to 35 grams lighter than it should have been; the Nam Thanh Bread Installation, which was delivered 832 kilograms of wheat flour, pilfered 115 kilograms. The inspection of a number of facilities within the public health sector showed that the sugar and milk of patients are not managed or used in accordance with principles and regulations. In 1979, the Phan Thiet Hospital in Thuan Hai sold 1,950 kilograms of patients' sugar to the Pharmaceuticals Corporation and to cadres and personnel of the hospital. The hospital also declared that it had installed additional beds and accepted additional patients when it had not in order to obtain products from the state. The inspection units have also inspected eight bus depots. It is common practice for personnel to slip tickets to the guard and driver to be sold at black market prices. Ticket personnel and drivers transport and sell tickets to very many persons in their own families, an average of 4 to 7 persons per trip, once as many as 28 persons. A number of busses in the southern provinces are supplied with fuel and oil by the state, but as soon as these busses leave the depot, the driver charges 13 to 15 dong for tickets that should sell for 1.80 dong.

The inspections conducted at the counters and stores mentioned above show that there are still many instances of distribution that is haphazard, that is neither fair nor reasonable and that is contrary to principles and regulations, thereby creating unnecessary difficulties in everyday life.

The workers' inspection units are welcomed and supported by the masses in all localities.

In a short period of time, the inspection units in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi conducted inspections many times at many stores and promptly uncovered many serious violations. Although only recently established, the inspection units of Nghe Tinh, Haiphong, Hau Giang, Kien Giang and Thuan Hai have recorded many good results. The workers' inspection units of Me Linh, Hoai Duc and Dong Anh Districts in Hanoi, the 4th Precinct and Go Vap District in Ho Chi Minh City and the Hong Bang unit in Haiphong are also units that have been welcomed by the masses. The units that operate well are those that have made thorough preparations, from the time they were first established, in every area from the selection of members to professional training and the organization of their operations.

There are still some localities that do not attach importance to the activities of the inspection units, that have done a perfunctory job in everything from disseminating policies and holding discussions among the various sectors to establishing units and creating the conditions needed for their operation. A number of provinces, although they have organized inspection units, only concerned themselves with these units at the outset; these particular units were organized in a form for form's sake manner and consist of too many persons (20-30) from many different agencies, consequently, it is very difficult for them to operate. Of the localities that have not organized units, some places do not have the necessary cadres but there are also places that have the necessary conditions but have not organized units.

The activities of the units are still restricted to the narrow scope of several simple matters. The large stores, the level II corporations and the housing distribution agencies are not being inspected. Many serious violations in the use, management and distribution of commodities and socialist property have been uncovered, but they either have not been promptly prosecuted or have been prosecuted slowly and unsatisfactorily.

The organization of the activities of the inspection units must be reviewed in order to gain experience. The Control Commission and the related sectors must coordinate to promptly act upon the proposals made by the inspection units and harshly deal with violations. A plan must be adopted for guiding the units in inspections concerning more complicated matters; at the same time, it is necessary to research and establish a system of training and awards for individuals and collectives and necessary to provide the units with the equipment needed for their operations.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ATTEMPT TO FLEE COUNTRY THWARTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Sep 80 p 4

[VNA News Release: "Quang Nam-Da Nang Punishes Gang That Stole Ship in an Attempt To Illegally Flee the Country"]

[Text] The Quang Nam-Da Nang People's Court recently held a public trial of Huynh Van Hong and his accomplices for the crime of stealing a ship and attempting to flee the country illegally.

Huynh Van Hong, from Da Nang, and persons named Tan, Thao and Trinh stockpiled weapons and paid Huynh Chi 650 dong to take them out to sea. When they came upon the ship of Mr. Duong Chau from Nai Hien Dong Ward, they boarded his ship, threatened him with guns and knives and then tied him up. They forced Trung (the captain of the vessel) to cut the anchor line but he then jumped overboard and swam to shore. They fired at him but missed. Then, Hong forced Chau to operate the ship under his direction. That night, taking advantage of a weakness on the part of his captors, Chau went down to the engine room where he dismantled the fuel system and then he and his son swam to shore and reported the incident to the local authorities.

In court, Hong and his accomplices confessed to their crime.

Born in 1952, Huynh Van Hong, alias Ho Em, was formerly a soldier in the puppet armored service and all of his accomplices fought as mercenaries for the Americans and puppets killing their compatriots. After liberation day, they were reunited with their families by the revolution so that they could earn a living. However, they refused to accept transformation, continued to live an extravagant, decadent style of life, organized the illegal use of weapons and plotted to steal a ship and flee overseas.

On the basis of the law and their crime, the Quang Nam-Da Nang Provincial People's Court handed down the following sentences: Huynh Van Hong was sentenced to death; Nguyen Van Trinh, Huynh Chi, and Huynh Ngoc Tan were sentenced to 18 years, 6 years and 2 years in prison respectively.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

THEFT OF 300 TONS OF GRAIN GOES UNSOLVED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Xuan Truat, the Ministry of Food: "Barges Involved in the Theft of Grain Must Be Pursued"]

[Text] A flotilla of four barges bearing the numbers 763 Hanoi, 05, 777 and 696 Haiphong entered the port of Bach Dang to be loaded with grain for shipment to various localities. According to regulations, when the persons in charge of means of transportation take on cargo, a person representing the owner of the cargo must be present to supervise the loading and issue a written order to the person in charge of the means of transportation telling him where to deliver the cargo. Ordinarily, if the port of Bach Dang has three or four conveyor belts in operation per shift, there are enough persons representing the various parties to provide supervision. This time, however, for some unjustified reason, the port doubled the number of conveyor belts and no one was there representing the parties to provide supervision. Taking advantage of this loophole, barge number 763 took on 895 bags of wheat flour, barge number 05 took on 1,108 bags, barge number 777 took on 1,922 bags and barge 696 took on 342 bags (the 70 kilogram type). The four barges took a total of 4,267 bags or nearly 300 tons of grade 1 flour. After taking on their cargo, the persons in charge of the means of transportation should have obtained transportation orders permitting them to transport the cargo to a specific destination before weighing anchor. However, before the barges were even loaded to capacity, all four of them left in search of a place to sell the flour. When this was discovered, the Haiphong Level I Grain Receiving Corporation sent official letters to the concerned river transportation installations and sent cadres to these installations many times but has found no trace of the four barges mentioned above.

It is suggested that the responsible agencies in Hanoi and Haiphong actively track down these barges in order to reclaim the 300 tons of grain for the state and prosecute this theft under the law.

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN QUANG NAM-DA NANG PROVINCE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "Quang Nam-Da Nang Province Accepts Many Outstanding Manual Workers and Youth Union Members into the Party"]

[Text] The party organization of Quang Nam-Da Nang Province has routinely attached importance to the quality of party development, considering it to be one of the primary prerequisites in evaluating and recognizing basic party organizations and chapters as strong and pure organizations and chapters.

Over the past 7 months, the party organization had accepted nearly 1,000 new members, nearly as many as were accepted during all of 1979. The party organizations of the Hoa Tho Textile Enterprise, the Southern Region Highway Department, the port of Da Nang and so forth have accepted nearly 50 new party members who are manual workers. The party organizations of Duy Xuyen, Hoa Vang, Dien Ban and other districts have accepted into the party more than 400 outstanding Youth Union members at agricultural cooperatives.

As a result of starting to attach importance to party development, Quang Nam-Da Nang has increased the number of installations that have party organizations by 24, 12 of which are production units at agricultural cooperatives, 10 of which are general schools, 1 of which is a fishing cooperative and 1 of which is a ward. The party organizations of these installations have begun to mobilize the people to carry out the political task of the unit. However, the province still has nearly 400 production units at agricultural cooperatives and dozens of artisan and handicraft installations that have no party members. Party members who are teachers only constitute .001 of the total number of teachers at general schools and many schools have no party base.

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PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

HA SON BINH ACCEPTS NEW PARTY MEMBERS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "Ha Son Binh Province Closely Links the Issuance of Party Membership Cards to the Performance of the Political Task"]

[Excerpt] The Ha Son Binh party organization has issued party membership cards to 527 basic party organizations, the equivalent of 44 percent of the basic party organizations and 33.7 percent of the party members within the province. The issuance of party membership cards has been carried out in a thorough manner, with importance attached to quality, to promptly correcting the tendency to place heavy emphasis upon numbers during the first phase within a number of units. The installations that were issued membership cards were inspected and the qualifications of their members were examined through the performance of their political task. The party committees of Ung Hoa District, Lac Son District and Ha Dong City have sent cadres to help the basic party organizations and have mobilized the masses to participate in party building. Of the 1,186 cases in which the masses requested that the qualifications of party members be re-examined, conclusions were reached in 892 cases and various forms of party disciplinary action were taken. The issuance of membership cards to fully qualified party members and the expulsion from the party of persons who have degenerated and become deviant in the party organizations of Ung Hoa, Chuong My, My Duc, Thanh Oai and so forth have had the effect of stimulating the performance of the political task. At these places, the movement has been strengthened, grain and food obligations have been performed better and so forth.

Ha Son Binh Province has also accepted 986 new party members, thereby increasing the fighting strength of the basic party organizations.

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PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

BRIEFS

NGHE TINH VCP MEMBERSHIP--during the last two phases, the Nghe Tinh party organization issued party membership cards to 46,446 party members, 30 percent of the total number of party members within the province; of this number, party members in the countryside constituted 50 percent, party members in enterprises constituted 15 percent, party members at agencies constituted 10 percent and party members in the various sectors constituted from 2 to 5 percent. The districts that issued membership cards to a high percentage of their party members are Nghi Loc, Cam Xuyen, Dien Chau, Quy Hop and Ky Son. [Excerpt] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Sep 80 p 1] 7809

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS IN SOUTHERN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Aug 80 p2

[Article by Dai Tani "Trade Unions and the Transformation and Development of Agriculture in the South"]

[Text] Bringing the peasants of the south onto the path of collective production and enabling agriculture to advance step-by-step to large-scale socialist production is a great mission for the entire party and our entire population, and at the same time is the direct responsibility of the working class and the trade unions. The trade union echelons of the southern provinces have regarded the task of transforming and developing agriculture as one of their basic, direct, and permanent responsibilities.

Enabling the workers and civil servants to fully understand the policy of transforming agriculture and campaigning for families to participate in agricultural cooperativization:

The workers and civil servants in the south play an important and direct role with regard to the great task of agricultural cooperativization. They both guide implementation by the villages and hamlets and campaign for their families and relatives to carry out the policy of transforming agriculture. (According to over-all data, about 70 percent of the workers and civil servants have families in the rural areas or have ties with the rural areas.)

During the first days of 1980, and especially during the recent period, in many areas in the Mekong Delta the trade unions, faced with the prospect that many production collectives were in danger of disintegrating, encouraged the workers and civil servants to explain the situation to their families, and to encourage their families to persistently and resolutely participate in building and consolidating the production collectives, in order to rapidly manifest the superiority of the collective way of production over the individual way. But the trade unions have not yet enabled the workers and civil servants to profoundly understand the necessity of cooperativizing agriculture in the south of our country, and the decisive role of the proletarian state and the working class with regard to advancing the peasants to socialism. Therefore, many cadres and civil servants

have not yet strictly and promptly implement the stand and policies, and some facilities have not been exemplary in carrying out the policy of transforming agriculture and the private tractor forces.

The movement has begun to effectively influence a number of principal technical measures of agricultural production.

Before the liberation middle peasant households worked more than 30 percent of the cultivated land or hired rich peasants to work it with machinery. After the liberation, the state set up a number of state-operated tractor stations and units in each province, but because agriculture has not yet been cooperativized most of them have not proved effective: their productivity is low, the plowing and harrowing costs are high, and the area plowed and harrowed is smaller than that plowed and harrowed when the tractors were privately owned. Nearly all of them have been operated at a loss, and some have even had to be disbanded.

In order to overcome that situation and gradually create incentives for the tractor collectives to work for the state, the trade unions in each province concentrated their guidance on creating a tractor station or unit in order to gain experience. In addition to teaching and activating the concept of collective mastery, the trade unions, along with the management organs, have paid attention to creating conditions for attaining the economic-technical norms, by such tasks as setting and attaining the norms regarding the productivity and quality of soil preparation and the consumption of fuel, signing contracts with the villages and hamlets regarding the location and extent of soil preparation, and being concerned about the living conditions of the tractor workers.

After a period of construction some state-operated tractor stations and units -- such as the Dien Ban (Quang Nam-Da Nang), Le Ninh (Binh Tri Thien), Ca Chi (Ho Chi Minh City), Northern Phu Khanh, and other tractor units, and recently the My Xuyen (Hau Giang), Gieng Rieng (Kien Giang), and other tractor stations -- have rather strong movements.

However, the economic effectiveness of the state-operated tractor stations and units is still below that of the privately owned tractors and the tractor collectives. One of the reasons is that organization and management are not yet unified and cooperativization is still narrow in scope and is not yet stable, as it has not created an appropriate area of operations for the tractors. A number of upper-echelon leadership cadres have used tractors arbitrarily (such as assigning tractors to transport bricks, tile, earth, and rock with which to build houses while the soil-preparation season is in progress, ordering that large tractors be sent to areas in which tractors cannot operate, and even using tractors to plow their own fields).

Although its supplies of chemical fertilizer, insecticides, and gasoline and oil for agricultural machines are very limited, every year the state

and sends large amounts for the southern provinces. But because the organization of distribution is not yet good, and especially because distribution in the villages and hamlets is still lax, materials have been obtained by corrupt people and sold on the outside. The trade unions have organized seminars to discuss ways to overcome that situation, and have organized a movement to transport and distribute these materials on schedule and directly to the peasants. The next step is to assure that the people receive sufficient fertilizer and truly use it for cultivation. The trade union in Ben Thu District (Dong Ap) coordinated with the Youth Union, the agricultural supplies store, and the village and hamlet production management committee, and discussed and implemented a plan to make public the quantities of fertilizer and JMI assigned to each village, hamlet, and production collective, so that the peasants would monitor the situation. Therefore, the long-standing situation of collusion and "leaking" was considerably improved.

The after-harvest production of machinery and agricultural implements, the training of tractor drivers and repairmen, and the organization of teams of workers to repair agricultural machinery for the production collectives and cooperatives, and to help plan production and rural construction, which have become voluntary tasks on the part of cadres and workers, have been organized by the trade unions and specialized organs in many enterprises, organs, and organizations. The Vinapro factory in Bien Hoa, in addition to producing and supplying good internal combustion engines for agricultural machinery, set up an agency in a Mekong Delta province to repair agricultural machinery and a mill which milled paddy for the peasants.

A movement for workers and peasants to cooperate in developing agriculture has been launched in some districts.

The district is the place where agriculture and industry are combined and is the echelon which directly manages and guides agricultural production, so in the long run the district trade union must be the echelon which organizes the movement for workers and civil servants to serve agricultural production. But at present, with regard to district echelon in general and the district-level trade union in particular are undergoing the process of construction. Many districts do not yet have conditions for organizing district-level trade unions. And in the districts in which they have been organized they are still very new and weak. Recently, however, such districts as Trich Mai in Binh Tri Thien Province, Go Cong in Tien Giang Province, Thanh Van in Phuoc Binh Province, Dien Ban in Quang Nam-Da Nang Province, Ben Thu in Dong Ap Province, etc., have begun to unite the workers and civil servants of the sectors and units in the district into a combined struggle, and have combined that strength with the agricultural production units in the district in order to concentrate on performing some key technical tasks in accordance with the agricultural production seasonal schedule, such as organizing activities and transportation, distributing fertilizer, purchasing grain, preparing the soil, broadcast-sowing rice, etc. In some districts (such as Dien Ban, Phuoc Van, etc.), the trade

unions have mobilized the scientific-technical cadres and workers to work with the peasants in creating "high-output industrial-agricultural fields," in order to gain experience in applying advanced production techniques, in applying industrial management methods to agriculture, and in organizing the movement to combine workers and peasants in accordance with the viewpoint of two classes producing one product.

Although the results that have been attained are only initial ones, they have had the great significance of creating consciousness and guiding the thoughts and acts of the workers and civil servants of the economic and sectors toward serving the foremost economic task -- transforming and developing agriculture and tying in the activities of the organs and enterprises with the political tasks. Furthermore, they have gradually enabled the peasant class to realize the role of industry and industrial workers toward the peasants, and have mobilized the peasants to enthusiastically fulfill their obligations toward the state, thereby further consolidating the worker-peasant alliance in the socialist revolution.

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AGRICULTURE

CROP STATISTICS FOR 10TH-MONTH RICE GIVEN

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "Two Million Seven Hundred and Ninety-Six Thousand Hectares of 10th Month Rice Planted by 5 September, Which Represents 84 Percent of the Planned Quota and an Increase Compared to the Same Period of Time Last Year; the Northern Provinces Concentrate on Cultivating Their 10th Month Rice and Preparing for the Winter Season; the Southern Provinces Sow Their Crops Rather Rapidly"]

[Excerpt] As of 5 September, according to the Statistics General Department, the entire country had planted 2,796,000 hectares of 10th month rice, 84 percent of the planned quota and an increase of some 300,000 hectares compared to the same period of time last year. The northern provinces have transplanted 1,189,000 hectares, 90 percent of the planned quota (minus the rice that was killed by flooding). The two recent tropical depressions caused heavy rains over a broad area and brought additional flooding to some land under the cultivation of rice, primarily in the provinces of Ha Nam Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa and Hanoi. These places are now retransplanting the rice that was lost.

The various localities are accelerating their cultivation and fertilization efforts, concentrating both their labor and fertilizer on these jobs, and preventing and controlling pests and diseases in order to achieve the highest possible rice yields. Fields of rice that have been promptly weeded are doing well.

Together with cultivating and fertilizing 10th month rice, the various localities are intensifying their preparations for the winter season in an effort to compensate for losses during the 10th month season.

This year, the provinces of the South have sown their crops rather rapidly, having transplanted 1,607,000 hectares of 10th month rice, the equivalent of 80 percent of their planned quota and an increase of some 400,000 hectares compared to the same period of time last year. The provinces from Thuan Hai southward have transplanted 1,398,000 hectares, 80 percent of their planned

quotas; Quang Nam-Da Nang Province has exceeded its planned quota by 44 percent; the provinces of Lam Dong, Dong Thap and An Giang have completed more than 95 percent of their planned quota; and the provinces of Song Be, Tay Ninh, Long An, Kien Giang and Minh Hai have completed from 82 to 89 percent of their planned quotas. The provinces of Phu Khanh, Thuan Hai, Cuu Long and Tien Giang have transplanted their crops the slowest.

The southern provinces have harvested 220,000 hectares of summer-fall rice, which represents 39.6 percent of the area planted and a slower rate of harvesting compared to the same period of time last year. The provinces from Thuan Hai southward have harvested 178,000 hectares, 36.5 percent of the rice transplanted; among these provinces, the provinces of the Mekong River Delta have harvested 154,000 hectares, 35.4 percent of their planned quota, with many places achieving high yields.

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AGRICULTURE

THAI BINH REPORTS ON WINTER CROPS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "Thai Binh Province Expands the Amount of Area under the Cultivation of Winter Potatoes"]

[Excerpt] With the determination to achieve yields of more than 30 quintals per hectare during the 10th month season, the collective farmers of Thai Binh Province are devoting their efforts to cultivating and fertilizing their 10th month rice crops, especially the main rice crops transplanted after the flooding. By the end of August, the various agricultural cooperatives had completed the first phase of weeding 10th month rice, 56 percent of which had been weeded for the second time. The districts have also guided the cooperatives in building additional embankments to retain water in high areas and combat waterlogging in lowlying fields while inspecting fields, grading the rice crop, establishing cultivation regulations suited to each plot, raising the degree of uniformity of the crop, applying additional manure and actively preparing fertilizer and seed for the winter crops.

To date, in addition to applying an average of nearly 7 tons of good livestock manure per hectare, Thai Binh has also applied 4,392 tons of nitrogen and 1,815 tons of human wastes to poorly developed rice and rice transplanted after the start of autumn.

As regards the winter season, the cooperatives have propagated more than 500 hectares of 3-month sweet potatoes and about 100 additional hectares in order to have enough plants to put 6,000 to 7,000 hectares under the cultivation of winter sweet potatoes. The cooperatives have begun to inspect the more than 6,000 tons of western potato cuttings of collectives in order to spray them for aphids; at the same time, plans have been adopted for purchasing additional potato cuttings from cooperative members to insure that 19,000 to 20,000 hectares of potatoes are planted. The province's seed corporation has distributed hundreds of tons of vegetable, soybean and corn seed to collective units.

Ha Son Binh Province is making every effort to cultivate the rice crops that have been transplanted while preparing 40,000 hectares for winter crops, including 20,000 hectares of western potatoes. During this winter season, the province will be planting a variety of western potatoes from the GDR, one that has a yield twice as high as the local variety. The cooperatives have discussed plans for loaning cropland to cooperative members so that everyone can prepare seed and fertilizer. In the districts of Ung Hoa, Thanh Oai and Thuong Tin, the early 10th month rice fields that are about to head or are heading have been loaned to cooperative members to plant sweet potatoes.

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AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL DISCUSSES ALLOCATION OF WINTER CROPS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Sep 80 p 1

[Editorial: "The Winter Crop Structure"]

[Text] In agriculture, the establishment of the allocation of crops is of important significance in helping to determine the final results of each production season. An efficient and scientific allocation of crops creates the conditions for highly developing the potentials that lie in arable land and labor, developing upon the favorable factors of the climate and weather and taking advantage of the strongpoints of each type crop, thereby providing a high yield and total output per unit of land.

The first prerequisite to establishing an efficient allocation of crops is to correctly implement the guidelines and task of the plan. The allocation of winter crops must meet three requirements: increasing the sources of grain and food for humans, increasing the sources of feed for livestock and increasing the sources of agricultural products for exportation, with the first requirement being the most important.

In view of the fact that land conditions vary in production, the allocation of winter crops cannot be the same for each area. The realities of the past 9 winter production seasons have shown that we can establish a general allocation of crops for the northern provinces. All areas attach important to the production of grain crops; however, in the lowlands, western potatoes are the main crop because they are suited to the fertile fields in this region and require much fertilizer. The midland provinces, the provinces of northern Trung Bo and the provinces in the humid mountainous area should raise many sweet potatoes, which are a crop that is easily planted and is suited to the various types of sandy soil. River silt field areas can expand the cultivation of corn and so forth. Soybeans are a food product crop of value that can be planted on a larger scale in many areas. Duckweed is a principal green manure crop in the winter season that must be developed.

Winter crops can be divided into two groups based on climatic conditions. One group consists of crops of tropical origin planted when the weather is still

warm, such as corn, sweet potatoes, soybeans, garlic, watermelons and so forth. If planted late, these crops cannot be harvested. The other group consists of plants of temperate zone origin that can be planted when the weather is becoming cold, such as western potatoes and winter vegetables and beans (kohlrabi, cabbage, green beans and so forth). Winter crops must be short-term crops of high economic value and must be scientifically arranged by planting season in systems of rotation cultivation, companion crops or overlapping catch crops so that one crop creates favorable conditions for the development of the following crop.

The allocation of crops must be based on the overall capabilities and conditions of each place and a full calculation of the practical economic returns that can be expected.

The allocation of winter crops is related to the allocation of 10th month and spring rice crops. The expansion of early 10th month rice plantings through the use of short-term varieties (which are transplanted in June and harvested in September) and the use of short-term, late spring rice varieties (which are transplanted in February and harvested in May) provide 5 months for the production of winter crops and the winter season is divided into many different phases, thereby helping to make the allocation of crops more diverse.

This year, some 10th month rice fields were transplanted late and this will affect winter crop production, especially the production of some early crops. By keeping abreast of the situation surrounding each planting of rice and each field, every cooperative should take the initiative and promptly establish its allocation of winter crops and formulate a strict planting schedule.

AGRICULTURE

WATERLOGGING HAMPER CROP PRODUCTION IN HA BAC PROVINCE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Sep 80 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Hai Hung and Ha Bac Provinces Take a Variety of Steps To Insure that All Land Available for Winter Crop Production Is Put Under Cultivation"]

[Text] Of the waterlogged fields in Hai Hung used to raise 10th month rice, much is used to raise winter crops as well. By means of suitable short-term varieties of rice and on the basis of its experience, Hai Hung has been trying to effectively overcome the difficulties it faces in order to achieve the highest possible stability in terms of the amount of area under cultivation and the allocation of winter crops.

Early, long-term winter crops are usually crops of high export value, such as garlic, winter watermelon, tomatoes, soybeans and so forth. In order to harvest such crops, they must be planted in early September and no later than 10 October. As a result of raising early, short-term 10th month rice, many places that have promptly combated waterlogging and achieved normal rice growth can harvest their crops during the first half of September; these cooperatives can still plant the early, long-term winter crops mentioned above during the best season.

Lowlying places that lost the majority or all of their crops and directly planted a very short-term reserve variety of rice, such as Can Tho 1 (which has a growing period of 70 days) or Nong Nghiep 1A (which has a growing period of 85 days), can still raise winter crops.

Many cooperatives in the districts of Nam Thanh, Kim Mon, Tu Loc, Cam Binh, Ninh Thanh and so forth have employed every possible technical measure and winter production season of the locality, such as planting seeds in a mound of dirt so that the plants live for a long time; on the other hand, they have prepared such dry soil so that they can plant on top of wet ground or raise seedlings in gardens or fields that can be worked early in order to thin them out at a later date and so forth.

Many installations have resolved their winter seed problems by balancing the supply of seed internally, trading with other installations or purchasing them from other localities.

Specific guidance has been provided regarding planting techniques. In each cooperative and household, such jobs as making mounds of dirt, preparing dried soil, making seedling nurseries, applying fertilizer and so forth have been carried out in an urgent manner.

In order to compensate for the 10th month rice that might be lost due to the typhoon and waterlogging, the standing committee of the Ha Bac Provincial Party Committee met to discuss ways to guide winter crop production. The provincial people's committee has sent groups of cadres to the various districts to re-examine their production plans, including the preparation of soil, seed, fertilizer, etc. The districts of Luc Ngan, Thuan Thanh, Tien Son, Lang Giang, Yen Dung and so forth have sent management cadres and technical cadres to the various villages to examine and supplement their winter crop production plans. The province has determined that seeds are the measure of decisive significance in expanding the amount of area under cultivation. The various districts have propagated more than 3,000 hectares of sweet potato vines, 1,000 hectares of which were propagated after typhoon number 4. The cooperatives have accelerated the cultivation of sweet potato vines. The entire province is endeavoring to plant 15,000 hectares of winter sweet potatoes.

The districts of Tien Son, Thuan Thanh and so forth, which raise many western potatoes, are conducting inspections to determine how many cuttings they have and are balancing the supply of cuttings with the plan for the amount of area to be put under cultivation and balancing the supply between places experiencing a surplus and places with a shortage.

Much corn is raised in Gia Luong, Thuan Thanh and Yen Dung Districts, which are districts that have back-up dikes. Corn will primarily be planted on silt fields and rice fields from which the water drained slowly. The province plans to plant 2,000 hectares of winter corn. The province's seed corporation has supplied the districts with 3,000 kilograms of vegetable seed of all types.

Ha Bac has attached importance to providing sources of fertilizer. In addition to chemical fertilizer, the province is trying to cultivate 3,000 hectares of duckweed. The chemical fertilizer will primarily be used in the western potato growing area at a rate of 200 kilograms of nitrogen sulfate per hectare. The fertilizer for sweet potatoes will primarily consist of the various types of green manure crops.

AGRICULTURE

MINH HAI PROVINCE REPORTS ON GRAIN CROP

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "Minh Hai Province Meets 94 Percent of Its Grain Mobilization Plan Quota for the 1979 10th Month Season"]

[Text] By the end of August, Minh Hai Province had met 94 percent of its grain mobilization plan quota for the 1979 10th month season, putting more grain into state granaries than any other locality in the country. Seven of the 13 districts and cities met or exceeded their grain quotas; Tran Van Thoi District led the province by exceeding its quota by 800 tons with Nam Can, Ngoc Hien and Phu Tan Districts and the two cities of Ca Mau and Minh Hai exceeding their quotas by 50 to 400 tons. The districts that have not met their grain quota yet are putting competent cadres on this job in an effort to complete the mobilization of grain in September.

The various party committee echelons and governments on the basic level have been determinedly mobilizing farmers while investigating and rechecking the amount of area under cultivation and output relatively accurately, assigning norms to each unit and closely coordinating educational, economic and administrative measures. The province and districts are concentrating their efforts on guiding production, insuring that all 10th month rice fields are planted and preparing the conditions needed to rapidly and systematically harvest summer-fall rice while continuing to mobilize grain in an effort to meet the plan norm.

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CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

STATE RICE FARMS CONSTRUCTED IN MEKONG DELTA

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Sep 80 pp 1, 4

[VNA News Release: "Efforts Focused on Rapidly Constructing the State-Operated Rice Farms in the Mekong River Delta; Movement Launched to Plant 500,000 Hectares of Green Manure Crops in the Southern Provinces"]

[Text] Recently, in Long An Province, the Ministry of Agriculture coordinated with the leadership cadres of the various ministries, sectors, provinces and state-operated rice farms in the Mekong River Delta to conduct a preliminary review of the situation surrounding the construction and production of state rice farms in the recent past, discuss the guidelines, tasks and harvesting measures for the 1980 10th month rice crop and discuss the implementation of the plan for building centralized rice growing areas and the production plans of the state farms for 1981.

In the recent past, in keeping with Council of Ministers' decision number 418/CP, the concerned ministries and sectors together with the various localities and basic units have been making every effort to build the rice growing state farms in the Mekong River Delta. In the six provinces of Kien Giang, Hau Giang, Minh Hai, An Giang, Long An and Dong Thap, nine centralized rice growing areas have been established, within which 26 state farms have begun production. During this year's 10th month season, the state farms sowed more than 34,000 hectares of rice, three times as much as in 1979. The rice at these farms is growing well. Planning, design work and capital construction at the state farms are also being carried out more urgently. Five of the nine areas, Vinh Hung in Long An Province, northern Ha Tien and An Bien in Kien Giang Province and Vinh Loi and U Minh in Minh Hai Province, have virtually completed their task and design projects. On the basis of their project planning, the state farms have dug hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of dirt to make canals and build roads and have cleared and put into production tens of thousands of hectares.

The construction of state rice farms in the recent past has also revealed a number of weaknesses and shortcomings, such as the failure of planning, design work and capital construction to keep pace with the requirements of

production. Management has not been implemented on a comprehensive basis; production is low compared to the plan and so forth.

The conference discussed the guidelines, tasks and measures for continuing to accelerate the clearing of land and the construction of specialised farming areas and state rice farms in the Mekong River Delta during the 5 years from 1981 to 1985. It is necessary to urgently accelerate the construction of material-technical bases and gradually lay firm foundations for the various areas and state farms to develop along the lines of specialised cultivation, intensive cultivation and large-scale socialist production; every possible capability must be employed in order to clear and put into production roughly 188,000 hectares of rice fields and gradually initiate intensive cultivation and multicropping at places where the necessary conditions exist in order to increase the amount of area under the cultivation of rice to approximately 287,000 hectares by 1985 with an average rice yield of 20 quintals per hectare and a total output of roughly 550,000 tons, with 400,000 tons being produced by state farms. It is necessary to organise the lives of the cadres, manual workers and people within these areas well and build the infrastructure of the new society, thereby insuring that the social welfare needs of laborers are met.

In 1981, it is necessary to urgently build material-technical bases for the state farms and areas that have been cleared and open a number of other areas and state farms by clearing an additional 68,800 hectares of land and increasing the amount of area under the cultivation of rice at state farms to 95,300 hectares in an effort to achieve a paddy output of roughly 150,000 tons. There are a number of pressing problems that must be quickly resolved in organization and management; the organization must be completely constructed and management must be tight.

Recently, in Ho Chi Minh City, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, in coordination with the Youth Union and Agricultural Service of the city, held a conference to review the movement to produce 35 million tons of organic fertilizer and launch a movement to plant 500,000 hectares of green manure crops in 1980-1981 in the provinces from Quang Nam-Da Nang southward.

In the more than 1 year since the movement was launched (April 1979), the provinces and municipalities of the South have brought about many changes and generated a rather widespread movement to produce organic fertilizer among the various strata of the people. Many provinces have built and strengthened livestock farms and pens and decomposition pits for livestock manure and green manure and established groups and units specializing in the production of manure at many cooperatives and production collectives; many good examples have been set in collecting, processing, planting and using livestock manure and green manure in the successful intensive cultivation of crops.

The representatives visited Tan Thoi Hiep Village in Hoc Mon District and the Tan Binh Organic Fertilizer Processing Plant in Ho Chi Minh City to study their experiences in raising and using duckweed on fields and achieving yields of 4 tons of paddy per hectare or more.

The Ministry of Agriculture has decided to present commendations and in kind awards to the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, 11 districts and cities and 33 villages, cooperatives and state farms. The Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union decided to present banners and in kind awards to the Communist Youth Unions of Quang Nam-Da Nang Province, Tien Giang Province, Ho Chi Minh City and 11 districts; present commendations to two provinces, 49 villages and six districts; and award commendations and the title "Brave Soldier" to 50 progressive individuals and one member of the Vanguard Teenagers' Unit in each of the 11 provinces in the South where the fertilizer production movement is developing well.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union and the Ministry of Agriculture have launched a movement to plant 500,000 hectares of green manure crops in 1980-1981, primarily duckweed and sesbania. The members of the Communist Youth Union in the various provinces and municipalities must concentrate their efforts on establishing organizations, investing in material bases and mobilizing farmers to continue to accelerate the movement to make organic fertilizer and create sources of fertilizer for intensive cultivation.

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CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

HA NAM NINH WORKS TO SAVE FLOODED RICE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Sep 80 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Ha Nam Ninh Province Takes Many Steps To Save Flooded 10th Month Rice"]

[Excerpt] Following the recent tropical storm, 67,000 hectares of 10th month rice in Ha Nam Ninh Province were flooded, nearly 40,000 hectares of which were deeply flooded.

The members of the standing committee of the provincial party committee went to the various districts to assess the situation and meet with the water conservancy sector, the power sector, the agricultural sector and the supply sector to determine ways to save the flooded rice.

The province has about 16,000 hectares of early rice that is heading and in the boot, rice that was transplanted on "van" fields and not affected by the waterlogging; nearly 90,000 hectares of rice transplanted as seedlings, which is in the final stage of tillering and can develop well if the water in these fields is promptly drained; and nearly 30,000 hectares of rice which was transplanted late, the majority of which was transplanted as seedlings raised on hard ground, and is now deeply flooded.

Ha Nam Ninh Province has given priority in the supplying of electric power to areas capable of combating the waterlogging and has delineated small areas in an attempt to save the rice crop. The province has decided to distribute two-thirds of its electricity around-the-clock to the seven large pump stations in the North and rapidly drain the lowlying districts. The province has provided detailed guidance with regard to the distribution of power to each region in exact accordance with the plan, thereby insuring that pump stations can operate in accordance with requirements and avoid the problem of one place simply sending its water to another place.

The districts have mobilized the masses to use buckets and spinners and perform every job necessary in the fields to save the rice. In areas located within regions in which large pump stations have drained water into the main canals, the cooperatives are using electric pumps, buckets and spinners to drain each small area.

AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

NGHIA BINH COOPERATIVIZATION--the party committee, people's committee and agricultural transformation committee of Nghia Binh Province have met to conduct a preliminary review of the movement to emulate and study Vu Thang and Ding Cong and overtake the Phuoc Thang 1 Cooperative, evaluate the results that have been achieved and point out the shortcomings and weaknesses that must be overcome in order to develop the emulation movement in the correct direction. Since May 1979, although it is still in the process of agricultural transformation, Nghia Binh has established 156 agricultural cooperatives, nearly one-half the number of cooperatives within the province. [VNA News Release] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Sep 80 p 1] 7809

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HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

NEW POWER PLANTS PUT INTO OPERATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Sep 80 p 2

[Article: "New Construction Project"]

[Excerpts] Rate of Construction Maintained at the Da River Hydroelectric Construction Site

For nearly 10 months, ever since construction of the main project began and the emulation movement was launched to record achievements in commemoration of the August Revolution and in celebration of National Day, 2 September, the Da River hydroelectric Construction General Corporation and the other units participating in construction have overcome numerous difficulties and maintained the planned rate of construction.

The various units have dug and spread 2.8 million cubic meters of dirt; constructed 14,000 square meters of wall, coated 124,000 square meters and constructed 21,000 square meters of roof; poured 24,000 cubic meters of concrete; excavated 1,700 tons of limestone; produced more than 6 million building bricks; excavated 63,000 cubic meters of stone and 36,000 cubic meters of sand; cut more than 2,000 cubic meters of timber into "khi" and so forth. The general corporation has been concentrating on maintaining the rate of construction of the dikes, the various footings, the Phuong Lam port, industrial roads numbers 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7, the housing areas for specialists and workers, the installation of machines numbers 1 and 2 of compressor station 8K, the construction of phase 1 of the concrete plant, the construction of the hydraulic machinery section and so forth.

Vietnamese cadres and workers and the specialists of the Soviet Union, fulfilling their emulation pledges, have improved management, made innovations, made technological improvements and brought about many changes for the better in construction, the supplying of materials, transportation, the installation of equipment, the training of technical workers and so forth. The general corporation has established a daily rate of construction for the various main projects. The Mechanized Construction Enterprise has instituted product contracts and efficiently deployed its labor. The Tunnel

Construction Enterprise has been making effective use of new construction machines and implemented integrated plans and measures, thereby raising the efficiency of drilling and blasting.

On 1 September, the general corporation accepted two 3rd Class Labor Medals and two commendations from the premier for the general corporation itself and its directly subordinate units. The general corporation has launched a new emulation campaign, which will last from 2 September until 7 November, to commemorate the 63rd anniversary of the October socialist revolution and the 1st anniversary of the start of construction. This campaign has the following specific goals: excavating to foundation pillar 11 on the downstream side of the flood discharge tunnel; putting the subsidiary projects of the tunnel into operation; installing a section of 100 cubic meter per minute air compressors; putting the supply warehouse into phase 1 operation; completing the foundation for one large crane at the main port; completing the construction of industrial roads number 3, number 5 and so forth.

Son La Puts a 1,600 Kilowatt Power Plant into Production

This 1,600 kilowatt power plant located in the center of Son La City and called the "2 September Power Plant" has the largest capacity of any power plant in the northwest and supports the development of production and the everyday lives of the ethnic minorities in the northwest region of the fatherland.

With equipment from the Soviet Union and the help of a number of central sectors, the collective of cadres and workers of the building and power sectors of Son La has been overcoming difficulties for nearly 3 years and learning and gaining experience while building the plant.

Minh Hai Puts Two 4,200 kilowatt Power Generators into Operation

Minh Hai Province recently put in two 4,200 kilowatt power generators into operation 7 days ahead of its deadline. The Provincial Power Management and Distribution Service transported 300 tons of machinery and equipment, constructed and safely installed the generator station and two transformers (each of which has a capacity of 2,900 KVA), constructed a 15 kilovolt transformer station with six power lines 2 kilometers long and installed various pieces of equipment to reduce the voltage in Minh Hai City on schedule.

With the two new generators in operation, the power generation capacity of Minh Hai Province has increased 3.3 times, thereby providing a supply of power to meet the needs of production and everyday life.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

OVER 470 KILOMETERS OF HIGHWAY 279 OPENED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "The Truong Son Corps Opens 470 Kilometers of Highway Number 279, Digging and Spreading More Than 6,840,000 Cubic Meters of Dirt and Stone"]

[Text] Having accepted the task of building Highway Number 279 under urgent conditions and with little time for preparation, the Truong Son Corps, fighting and maintaining a high level of combat readiness while working, has upheld its tradition of "opening the road to victory" by overcoming many difficulties with equipment and supplies, coordinating manual labor with machines well and improving its tools in the process of road construction. The various units creatively applied the experiences gained in the construction of the Truong Son Road and improved their organisational and command skills as well as their bridge and road construction skills.

In 9 months of working, the labor force on the road opened 470 kilometers of stage one highway on schedule, meeting all technical design requirements; it also dug and spread 6,840,000 cubic meters of dirt and stone, paved 154 kilometers with stone at important places along the road, constructed 172 meters of permanent bridges, 384 meters of temporary bridges and more than 32,000 meters of embankments and completed the construction of two ferry landings.

Representative of the emulation movement to build this road is Group B44. The unit creatively implemented a construction method involving centralization, a production line approach, deep specialization, thoroughness, integration and coordination and knew how to coordinate the strength of personnel, improved implements, mechanized vehicles and explosives to achieve the highest possible efficiency. The group purchased or produced hundreds of improved vehicles and boldly used "ke lot" vehicles to transport stone and support construction well before the onset of the rainy season. During the first 6 months of the year alone, the unit produced nearly 60 percent of its total output value for all of 1980.

On the occasion of the commemoration of the 35th National Day, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation awarded emulation Banners to Groups B91, B34, B44, B73 and the Survey and Design Institute, which are units that recorded outstanding achievements in the construction of this road.

POPULATION CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

PROSCRIBED LITERATURE READILY AVAILABLE

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 6 Aug 80 p 4

[Article by Ba Tra: "Saigon's Many Faces Column: When Will That Saga End?"]

[Text] Last Sunday, Ba Tra took a leisurely walk on Le Loi street (formerly Bonard). He casually stopped at the open air book market sandwiched between Nguyen Thi Minh Khai and Nguyen Trung Truc streets.

All kinds of books were displayed on nylon sheets on the curb. To be sure, the most decadent publications were not exposed for sale. However, such titles as "Chinese Astrology," "Korean Ideographic Astrology," "Two Weddings," "Godfather," and a number of funny but profane stories by Ly Dinh Du as well as decadent foreign novels were seen alongside Chinese novels, cookbooks, etc. More noticeable were verbal blurbs. More than one vendor told Ba Tra, "Please buy a book! We can cater to all your needs. We have all titles, but don't display them here."

That persistent hype aroused Ba Tra's curiosity. He asked, "Do you carry novels by Quynh Dao?"

"We even have more exciting authors than Quynh Dao," a vendor said, "but about Quynh Dao, the price is 30 dong a volume. OK?"

Come on! They were not only content to peddle decadent books, they also charged exorbitant prices!

Nearly keeling over, Ba Tra beat a hasty retreat, and proceeded toward the bookstalls on Dang Thi Nhu street. Since he was holding a bulky handbag, a couple of kids inquired, "Books for sale? If you have Quynh Dao we're going to pay 15 dong per volume. And much more for ancient Chinese love-and-war fiction."

What a shame! Ba Tra simply drifted from Scylla to Charybdis. He shrugged and entered the book displaying area. There, books are orderly placed on stands and shelves, mainly foreign publications, all sorts of

dictionaries, and a multitude of cookbooks, textbooks, books on medicine, mechanics and electricity, and ancient Chinese novels, etc.

A book vendor asked Ba Tra, "Can I help you? What title are you looking for?"

Ba Tra mumbled, "Do you carry old-time fiction?"

"Sure, we do. Quynh Dao, Le Hang, Nguyen Thuy Long, and Duyen Anh, to begin with."

"And others?"

"Every author, every title. Provided that you have money, and that you have agreed with us on prices."

This reply fully reflected the dimension of the issue of decadent literature. It is really a drawn out saga. No end is in sight, unless there is an everyday effort at education and strict control, and more importantly, unless the readers aware of its venom, take it upon themselves to shun and resolutely ostracize that literature.

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BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Phan Anh [PHAN ANH]

Member of the Presidium of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity and Friendship with People of Other Nations; Chairman of the Vietnam Committee for the Defense of World Peace; on 9 September 1980 he attended the arrival in Hanoi of a Palestine Liberation Organization delegation. (NHAN DAN 11 Sep 80 p 1)

Đặng Quốc Bảo [DAWNGJ QUOOCS BAOR]

Member of the VCP Central Committee; 1st Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; on 9 September 1980 he attended a National Day Reception at the Bulgarian Embassy. (NHAN DAN 10 Sep 80 p 1)

Vũ Xuân Chiêm [VUX XUAAN CHIEEM], Major General

Vice Minister of National Defense; on 5 September 1980 he attended an awards ceremony in Hanoi for USSR and Vietnamese cosmonauts. (NHAN DAN 6 Sep 80 p 1)

Hồng Chương [HOONGF CHUWOWNG]

Deputy Editor in Chief of the VCP theoretical journal TAP CHI CONG SAN; on 23 August 1980 he was scheduled to speak at the Doan Ket Club on the August Revolution. (HANOI MOI 23 Aug 80 p 4)

Lê Quang Công [LEE QUANG COONG], *Lieutenant Colonel

*Deputy Commander, Tien Giang Military Command; he was mentioned in an article on troop recruiting in his province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 8 Sep 80 p 3)

Võ Chí Công [VOX CHIS COONG]

Member of the Political Bureau of the VCP Central Committee; Vice Premier; on 9 September 1980 he attended a National Day Reception at the Bulgarian Embassy. (NHAN DAN 10 Sep 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Đán [NGUYEENX VAWN DANF], Prof.

Vice Minister of Public Health; he is the author of an article in this issue entitled, "Step Up Production of Medicines According to the Spirit of the VCP Central Committee's Sixth Plenum Resolution." (TAP CHI DUOC HOC No 3, May-Jun 80 pp 1-3)

Phạm Văn Đồng [PHAMJ VAWN DOONGF]

Member of the Political Bureau of the VCP Central Committee; Premier; on 5 September 1980 he attended awards ceremonies for Vietnamese and Soviet cosmonauts. (NHAN DAN 6 Sep 80 p 1)

Minh Đạt [MINH DATJ]

*Standing Member of the VCP Committee, Hanoi; Vice Chairman of the Peoples Committee, Hanoi; Head of the Hanoi Flood and Storm Countermeasures Committee; on 26 July 1980 he chaired a meeting of the VCP Standing Committee of Hanoi to discuss damage from tropical storm No 4. (HANOI MOI 27 Jul 80 p 1)

Lê Hải [LEE HAIR], *Colonel

*Deputy Commander B.2 Air Force Gp; an article about him appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 8 Sep 80 p 3)

Lê Quang Hiệp [LEE QUANG HIEEPJ]

SRV Ambassador to Bulgaria; recently he attended a meeting of the Bulgaria-Vietnam Friendship Association to mark Vietnam's National Day. (NHAN DAN 7 Sep 80 p 1)

Lê Khắc Hiếu [LEE KHAWCS HIEEUS]

*Acting Chairman of the People's Committee, Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone; on 4 September 1980 he conducted visiting Vietnamese and Soviet cosmonauts on a visit of his Zone. (NHAN DAN 6 Sep 80 p 4)

Lê Quang Hòa [LEE QUANG HOAF], Lieutenant General

Member of the VCP Central Committee; Vice Minister of National Defense; on 2 September 1980 he attended ceremonies in Havana, Cuba marking the SRV National Day. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 8 Sep 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Khoa Diệu Hồng [NGUYEENX KHOA ZIEEUJ HOONGF]

Vice Chairman of the Vietnam Committee in Support of Korea; on 9 September 1980 she attended ceremonies marking the 32nd National Day of the DPRK. (NHAN DAN 10 Sep 80 p 4)

Lê Thiết Hùng [LEE THIEETS HUNGF]

Chairman of the Vietnam Committee in Support of Korea; on 8 September 1980 he attended a reception at the DPRK Embassy honoring the 32nd Anniversary of the DPRK. (NHAN DAN 9 Sep 80 p 1)

Trần Văn Hưng [TRAANF VAWN HUWNG]

SRV Ambassador to Algeria; on 4 September 1980 he visited the Vietnamese exhibit at the 17th International Fair in Algeria. (NHAN DAN 10 Sep 80 p 4)

Ba Khôi [BA KHOWIR], *Lieutenant Colonel

*Deputy Commander, Tien Giang Province Military Command; he was mentioned in an article on recruiting in his province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 8 Sep 80 p 3)

Nguyễn Duy Lạc [NGUYEENX ZUY LACJ], Colonel

His article "The Signal Forces Build a Strong Branch and Meet the Combat and Construction Needs of the People's Army" appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 9 Sep 80 p 3)

Đinh Ngọc Lâm [DINH NGOCJ LAAM]

*Vice President of the Vietnam Physics Association; on 1 August 1980 he was scheduled to speak at the Dan Chu Club in Hanoi on "Soviet Vietnamese Cooperation in Space Flight." (HANOI MOI 1 Aug 80 p 4)

Dương Bạch Liên [ZUWOWNG BACHJ LIEEN]

Vice Minister of Communications and Transportation; on 8 September 1980 he was present when Acting President of the SRV, Nguyen Huu Tho, received a Lao trade delegation. (NHAN DAN 9 Sep 80 p 1)

Trần Mạnh [TRAANF MANHJ]

*Head of the Civil Air General Department; on 11 September 1980 he headed a delegation that left the SRV to attend the 23rd Congress of the International Civil Air Organization held in Montreal, Canada. (NHAN DAN 12 Sep 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Thế Nguyên [NGUYEENX THEES NGUYEEN], *Senior Colonel

*Head of the Military History Department of the Advanced Military Academy; on 28 August 1980 he was scheduled to speak at the Fatherland Front Club on the 35-year history of the Vietnam People's Army. (HANOI MOI 26 Aug 80 p 4)

Thái Phiên [THAIS PHIEEN]

*Deputy Head of the Soil and Agricultural Chemistry Institute [Vien Tho nhuong-nong hoa]; his article on the history of his institute appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 10 Sep 80 p 3)

Phạm Hữu Phúc [PHAMJ HUX PHUWCS]

Chief of the Institute of Transportation Technology, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; he is the author of an article in this issue which sums up speeches presented in four specialized conferences organized by the Ministry in 1979 to discuss the S&T revolution in the railway and maritime sectors. (KHOA HOC KY THUAT GIAO THONG VAN TAI No 3, Jun 80 pp 1-4, 14)

Nguyễn Quyết [NGUYEENX QUYETS], *Lieutenant General

Portions of his diary of events that occurred in 1945 appeared in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 15 Aug 80 p 2)

Hoàng Bích Sơn [HOANGF BICHS SOWN]

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; on 6 September 1980 he attended awards ceremonies for Vietnamese and Soviet cosmonauts. (NHAN DAN 6 Sep 80 p 1)

Lê Sơn [LEE SOWN]

Head of the Department of Supplementary Education, Ministry of Education; his article "Supplementary Education for the Cadres and Workers" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 8 Sep 80 p 2)

Nguyễn Đình Thành [NGUYEENX DINHF THANH]

SRV Ambassador to Denmark; on 2 September 1980 he attended SRV National Day activities at the Denmark-Vietnam Friendship Association in Copenhagen. (NHAN DAN 10 Sep 80 p 4)

Phạm Văn Thuần [PHAMJ VAWN THUAANF]

*Chairman of the Fatherland Front Committee, Vinh Phu Province; on 8 September 1980 he attended ceremonies marking Bulgarian National Day. (NHAN DAN 10 Sep 80 p 4)

Xuân Thủy² [XUAAN THUYR]

Secretary of the VCP Central Committee; Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly; Secretary General of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly; on 5 September 1980 he attended an awards ceremony for Vietnamese and Soviet cosmonauts. (NHAN DAN 6 Sep 80 p 1)

Vũ Trần Thực² [VUX TRAAFN THUWCJ], Deceased

Deputy Head of the Inspection Section of the Ministry of Education; he died following an illness on 7 September 1980 at age 60. (NHAN DAN 9 Sep 80 p 4)

Lương Ngọc Toán² [LUWOWNG NGOCJ TOANR]

*Vice Minister of Education; on 8 September 1980 he was present when SRV Acting President Nguyen Huu Tho addressed members of the Ministry of Education on the 35th Anniversary of the Ministry. (NHAN DAN 9 Sep 80 p 1)

Phan Lương Trục [PHAN LUWOWNG TRUWCJ], *Colonel

*Commander, Tien Giang Province Military Organization; he was mentioned in an article on troop recruitment in his province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 8 Sep 80 p 3)

Đào Duy Tùng [DAOF ZUY TUNGF]

Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Training Department of the VCP Central Committee; recently he spoke at a conference of Hanoi education administration cadres. (HANOI MOI 31 Jul 80 p 1)

Hoàng Tùng [HOANGF TUNGF]

*Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Delegation to the Parliamentary Union; recently he attended the departure of SRV National Assembly delegation for the 67th Parliamentary Union Congress in Berlin. (NHAN DAN 12 Sep 80 p 1)

Vũ Quốc Uy [VUX QUOOC S UY]

Acting Head of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Other Nations; on 8 September 1980 he attended a reception at the DPRK Embassy in honor of the 32nd Anniversary of the DPRK. (NHAN DAN 9 Sep 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Phụng Vũ [NGUYEENX PHUWOWNGJ VUX]

*Deputy Head of the China Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; on 11 September 1980 he was present when the SRV released 17 Chinese infiltrators to the PRC. (NHAN DAN 12 Sep 80 p 4)

Mai Vy [MAI VY]

Vice Minister of Culture and Information; on 5 September 1980 he attended a talent show in Ho Chi Minh City. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 8 Sep 80 p 1)

HANOI REVIEW OF EVENTS FOR 16 MAY-15 JUNE 1980

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English July 80 pp 31, 32

[Text]

May

17 Le Duan, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPV, receives a delegation of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

- Hanoi: Closing of the "Vietnam and the World" International Conference in celebration of President Ho Chi Minh's 90th birthday. The conference issues a declaration praising President Ho Chi Minh's great virtues and accomplishments and expressing solidarity with the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Beijing expansionists, for national defence.

- Start of the construction of the Pha Lai thermo-electric power plant (Hai Hung province) built with Soviet assistance. The initial capacity of the plant will be greater than the total capacity of the existing electric power plants in North Vietnam.

- Arrival of a delegation of the Hungarian People's Army led by Lieutenant General Istvan Olah, member of the CC of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Vice-Minister of National Defence and Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

19. A grand meeting is held in Hanoi to celebrate President Ho Chi Minh's 90th birthday. Truong Chinh, Political Bureau member of the CC of the CPV, Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, delivers a speech recalling the great work of President Ho Chi Minh and calling on the entire Party, people and army to act upon his Testament.

- As of 19 May 1975, more than one million people and 1,000 foreign delegations have visited the house where President Ho Chi Minh lived and worked.

- Signing in Hanoi of agreements on co-operation and development for the two fiscal years 1980 - 1981 and 1981 - 1982 between Vietnam and Sweden and on Swedish continued assistance to Vietnam in building the Bai Bang Paper Mill (Vinh Phu province), the Hanoi Children's Hospital and a polyclinic in Uong Bi (Quang Ninh)

20. Closing in Hanoi of the 5th meeting of specialists of Vietnam and Indonesia on the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries.

21. The SRV Government recognizes the Government of the Republic of Surinam and declares its readiness to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries.

22. To Huu, Deputy Prime Minister and Political Bureau member of the CC of the CPV, receives the visiting delegation of the Kampuchean Ministry of Education led by Minister Chan Ven, member of the CC of the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea.

- On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong sends a message of congratulations to the International conference "For Independence, Security and Socio-economic Progress" held in Colombo (Sri Lanka).

- Signing in Sofia of the minutes on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the consular agreement between the SRV and the People's Republic of Bulgaria which was signed in Hanoi on 1 October 1979.

- Inauguration at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris of an exhibition of Vietnamese paintings, photos, and art products, beginning two weeks of cultural activities in celebration of Nguyen Trai's 600th birthday.

24. Arrival of Zambian Foreign Minister WM Chakula on an official friendship visit to Vietnam.

- The Action Committee for the Unification of Vietnamese Buddhism makes its first public appearance in Hue City.

25. The People's Court of Quang Nam - Da Nang province tries a gang of criminals who committed murder and seized a ship in an attempt to go abroad illegally. One of them, Tran Gianh, is sentenced to death.

27. A memorial plaque for President Ho Chi Minh is inaugurated at No. 1 Kalinin Boulevard in Moscow where the late President worked for the Comintern in 1923 - 1924. The ceremony is held jointly by the Moscow Committee of the CPSU and the City Soviet.

- In Phnom Penh, a delegation of the Vietnam Fatherland Front led by Hoang Quoc Viet, member of the CC of the CPV, and President of the Presidium of the CC of the Front, holds talks with a delegation of the CC of the NUPSK headed by President Heng Samrin.

30. In Hanoi, the General Company for equipment import and technical exchange under the Ministry of Foreign Trade, using the long-term loans granted by the International Development Association (IDA) for the second time invites tenders for the supply of materials and equipment for the Dau Tieng Irrigation work (South Vietnam). Nineteen companies from Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Japan have sent in tenders.

- The France - Vietnam Friendship Association holds a conference in Paris on the problem of economic, scientific and technological co-operation between France and Vietnam.

31. The Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union decides to hold its 4th National Congress in October 1980.

- *Nhan Dan*: At the invitation of the All-Russian Orthodox Church, an episcopal delegation of the Vietnamese Catholic Church led by Cardinal Trinh Van Can arrives in Moscow on a visit.

- On the occasion of June 1, International Children's Day, a Youth Theatre - reserved for the youth and for children - is officially inaugurated in Hanoi. SRV Acting-President Nguyen Huu Tho attends the ceremony.

June

4. Arrival of a delegation of the Communist Party of Australia led by National Secretary Eric Aarons.

- *Nhan Dan*: According to a communiqué of the Vietnam Commission of Inquiry into War Crimes Committed by the Chinese Expansionists and Hegemonists, in May 1980, the Chinese side made 246 armed provocations against Vietnam, causing great losses of life and property.

5. Opening of the Soviet Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City.

- 104,000 secondary-school pupils throughout the country sit for graduation exams.

- Signing in Phnom Penh of a protocol on monetary exchanges and on accord on payments between Vietnam and Kampuchea.

- *Nhan Dan* Hau Giang province in Vietnam has donated to the people of Kompong Chhnang (Kampuchea) 1,000 tons of high-yield rice seeds and hundreds of tons of chemical fertilizers, insecticide, farm machinery and tools.

6. Opening of the GDR Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City

- Brian Walker, Director General of OXFAM, arrives in Vietnam on a visit.

- The Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of Kampuchea states that Kampuchea wishes to settle all problems with Thailand through negotiations.

7. Completion of the parabolic antenna measuring 12 metres across and weighing 6 tons for the *Hoa Sen* (Lotus) ground station receiving satellite communications. It has been built with Soviet assistance.

8. Signing in Budapest of the minutes on coordination of national economic planning for 1981-1985 between Vietnam and Hungary.

10. Signing in Berlin of the minutes on coordination of national economic planning for 1981-1985 between Vietnam and the GDR.

12. A delegation of the Vietnamese Government, led by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, leaves Hanoi for the 34th session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) to be held in Prague, Czechoslovakia on 17 June 1980.

- The Conference of Asian meteorological services held in Geneva confirms that Vietnam's meteorological station number 48860 on Hoang Sa (Paracels) Islands is part of the network of Basic Synoptic Observation stations of the World Meteorological Organization.

- The spokesman of the Kampuchean Foreign Ministry issues a statement exposing the Thai authorities' scheme in the plan for "voluntary repatriation" of Kampuchean refugees.

- Arrival in Moscow of an economic delegation of the SRV Government led by General Vo Nguyen Giap, Political Bureau member of the CC of the CPV, Deputy Prime Minister, Chairman of the Vietnamese Section of the Vietnam - USSR Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Co-operation, to attend the sixth session of this Commission.

- Signing in Sofia of the minutes on coordination of national economic planning for 1981 - 1985 between Vietnam and Bulgaria.

15. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam sends a message of congratulation to the first congress of the Organizing Committee of the Party of Ethiopian Labouring People.

- SPK (Kampuchean News Agency): The Swedish Government agrees to the opening of an information bureau of the People's Republic of Kampuchea in Stockholm.

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28 Oct '80
